The Oracle Part 2 Ethos

by Franc



-Ethos is the property that determines our moral conduct.



1. The Oracle defines ethics, as the moral behaviour of all human beings.

2. The definition of the concept of right and wrong conduct is commonly known as ethics or understood, as a form of nomos.

4. Its field deals with the concerned matters of value, and thus comprise the branch of philosophy called axiology. The Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle are a reflection of what we should emulate, with the natural constitution of our behaviourial traits.

5. Ethics attempts to resolve those responsory questions of human morality, through the definition of concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. Aristotle had devised six varieties of character that included vice, incontinence, cruelty, virtue, continence, and kindness, as examples of our characters, within their positive and negative forms and implications.

6. The dilemma is what is morally correct is not what is morally demonstrated or the expression desiderated in malism. "Imagine for yourself a character, a model personality, whose example you determine to follow, in private as well as in public," said Epictetus.

7. This is where the actual discipline of ascesis is practised and engaged, with the goodness of our character, disposition and civility. Plato said, "In the world of knowledge, the essential Form of Good is the limit of our inquiries, and can barely be perceived; but, when perceived, we cannot help concluding that it is in every case the source of all that is bright and beautiful-in the visible world giving birth to light and its master, and in the intellectual world dispensing, immediately and with full authority, truth and reason-and that whosoever would act wisely, either in private or in public, must set this Form of Good before his eyes."

8. Ethics can also be used to describe a particular person's own idiosyncratic principles or habits, in a comprehensive manner or within an endeictic dialogue that is representative of the manifestation of an oikeiosis.

9. In this case conduct in humans is pervasive, when we manifest our behaviour, into a series of actions, motions and causes. Aristotle said, "All human actions have one or more of these seven causes: chance, nature, compulsions, habit, reason, passion, desire."

10. Thus, this action is a clear representation of the logicalisation of ethics and rectitude that contradicts with heteronomy. We must know the intelligible difference, between an experimental act of techne and a rational act of episteme.

11. When we act in solecism, our state of mind is affected subsequently, in its general capacity and lucidity to distinguish the contrast, between right from wrong.

12. It becomes tainted in desition, with such immoral judgement and uncertainty that sufflaminates us, in dubiety and rhathymia. "Nature has given men one tongue but two ears, that we may hear from others twice as much as we speak," said Epictetus.

13. This is the precise inducement for the erratic nature of our actions that we do not averruncate in time, with normality. Ethics is the refinement of the proper conscience.

14. If we did not have ethics to distinguish our conduct, then our thoughts and actions would be void of any moral guidance. Socrates said, "A system of morality which is based on relative emotional values is a mere illusion, a thoroughly vulgar conception which has nothing sound in it and nothing true."

15. As human beings there must be a definite protocol of the observance of ethics, for the accountability of our moral behaviour and physis. To the ancient Athenians it was taught within the paideia.

16. We cannot exist in a lawless society or in a misguided world of ingrates that are parvescient to the notion of optimality and the omnibus laws we profess.

17. Therefore, we must surely base our conductual actions, on the objective premise of ethos, mores and rationalism. Aristotle said, "Men acquire a particular quality, by constantly acting in a particular way."

18. To be morally guided is a necessity that all humans should aspire to that belief and avoid the heteronomous influence of others and cupidity.

19. There is an obvious distinction, between what religion describes moral guidance and what philosophy perceives it to mean in its practice and formulation of relativism.

20. Within this form of philosophy, the interpretation of ethics is determined, not by righteousness, but with proper action and not nescience.

21. Thus, the consequential effects that result afterwards are zoetic, in the development of our lives that are determined, by our dionysian or apollonian acts.

22. It is truly analogous to the predicaments we must overcome in life. There is either the possibility of action through impulsive behaviour or reasonable restraint.

23. Our active inspirations or compulsions conduce us to one extreme or the other, yet we must find a true balance that could effectively establish that foundation.

24. If not, then we shall become susceptible to the particular problems and instability that arouse from those epitonic predicaments.

25. The difficult challenge that we confront with this property of ethos is the discovery of our authentic identity in such meticulosity.

26. We can be thrasonical in our ego or be conscious of the relativity of our conduct and the mere perception that others have of us subsequently.

27. There are moments, when we lose that absolute control and succumb to our impulses and manias causing our indecisions and irrational behaviour that are deprehendable, with our hesitancy.

28. This is when we must apply the concept of logic to ethics. If not, then the post-haste actions of our impulses would dominate our mind.

29. It is the consentaneous method that ethos is established, but the elements of awareness and comprehension are what define the essence of moral conduct.

30. I can decide to act bad or good and my actions would be then judged entirely, by my behaviour and the relation that attaches it to the mind.

31. Behavioural issues are more studied and observed in psychology than philosophy, but are not dismissed as an impractical matter.

32. Philosophy simply attempts to interject a rational explanation, for this material property of ethos, within a concessive degree of the communion of thoughts and the distinction, between the Aristotelian concepts of bouleusis and prohairesis.

33. It does not impose its teachings as obtuse, instead, it only enlightens the mind of the inquisitive reader to be cognisant of adiaphora and moral values.

34. It has been asked, whether conduct in general is an innate trait of idiosyncrasy or a learnt repetition of a rhetorical effect.

35. In accordance to my meticulous observation, I have surmised that conduct is a learnt repetition that extends, beyond a preconceived ideology.

36. I have based that supposition on the fact and not a maxim that behaviour is not inherited, but acquired by experience.

37. Even though, we can debate the argument, as a philosopher or a psychologist, the relation, between moral conduct and action is correlative to the belief.

38. Reaction responds to the actuated thoughts of behaviour and its reciprocal balance that ensues, from that reactionary response.

39. If behaviour is essentially controlled by the mechanism of thought, then action causes definitely reaction in return.

40. The simplest unstable thought could provoke a reactionary response, whilst the inconsequential action of conduct could facilely disrupt the pattern of thought.

41. The consequence that results afterwards from the possible provocation of our thinking is calculated as unnecessary.

42. Ipse facto, the visible consequence that results is the corruption of the impure soul, at its most vulnerable state and engagement.

43. The creation of ethos was designed to avoid, such unfortunate occurrences and collapsible thoughts that prevented our mind to function properly.

44. We can be ethical and at the same time use thought to be morally guided and disciplined, as we display acts of liberality or eutrapelic wit.

45. There is no distinct contradiction, in this ruminative assertion of mine or its relevance and complaisance, because what is being mentioned is the comportment of an individual.

46. Moral conduct is a considerable factor in the way we not only act, but it also dictates the way others perceive us naturally.

47. Because of this, that is the reason that comportment is exceedingly of vital significance to the criterion of ethos and its kalokagathical implication.

48. We often ignore in philosophy the consequence of moral conduct, since it is more attributed to the sesquipedalian terminology of psychology.

49. However, it is the concept itself that is being addressed and not just the invariable nature of its regard or epikeia.

50. When we involve moral conduct in the conversation, we are assuming the state or condition of that particular behaviour.

51. The topic can be presumed to be something in general, but the practicality of the matter is that ethos requires its function.

52. The immediate omission of that acknowledgement would be denoting its philosophical value and paralogising.

53. Without the value of its properties and fundamentals, philosophy would cease to be understood and tralaticious, beyond the metaphorical sense.

54. Ergo, its essence is intrinsically linked to the daily evolution of our thoughts and emotions that we either impose or dismiss.

55. On the contrary, it would then render these two things specified, as not interchangeable with each other. That would cause a reasonable disruption of the mind.

56. As with emotions, conduct must be equally balanced to be efficient, if we are to be novaturient and visionary, with our impressions.

57. If this is not achieved, then the clarity of each variable remains indefinite and there would be no familiar verity.

58. This will reflect in the instantaneous fluctuation of our present mood changes and velleities, with their intensification.

59. These peculiar changes can inhibit our thinking and acting considerably, as well be the privation of logic and obsession of utinams.

60. We value the decency of our honour and the earnest token of respect personified, through the gratification of ethics within its endemicity.

61. It is extremely significant that we actuate in accordance to ethics and be knowledgeable, with our introspection.

62. Its archetypal belief and practice form the best concept we can implement with logical judgement and rationale.

63. If we are to propound the improvisation of its relativity, then we must procure the motive, for its optimal function.

64. Human behaviour is not necessarily a reference to our action, but a reference to our thoughts and foreknowledge also.

65. It is the clear indicator of a pattern that corresponds to the perspective we reflect with our actions and not our philotimon.

66. What matters is not the admission of our guilt, instead the awareness of our comportment in life and convention.

67. There is no need to eschew the state of our conceptual behaviour with the subtlety of induction, if we are conscious of its relevancy.

68. Our actions manifest are the example of moral guidance that we should appreciate with just reverence and acknowledgement.

69. Ethics create the reliable affirmation to the standard of behaviour that we should strive to accomplish in our nitency.

70. The Oracle justifies the actual necessity for ethos, as a natural concept of a reasonable persuasion and approach that is not a mere formality.

71. Our conduct is the desitive embodiment of our actions and reactions that have been determined and established.

72. Thus, the relation between the mind and body is compatible to its vincular nature and collaboration that are suitable for the purpose of its establishment.

73. How we then approach ethics is conditioned to the method that pertains to the interpretative notion of its design.

74. We can choose to acknowledge it, as a relevant part of our moral guidance or simply ignore its presence and be immoral in our conduct and ascolia.

75. The sensible thought is that our lives require an equal balance of logos and ethos to adapt to the emergence of our ordeals and problems.

76. It is a necessary prerequisite that takes precedence, over other nascent forms of practicality induced, by the concepts of philosophy.

77. Within the configuration of our society, we are frequently confronted, with the uncertain nature of our future and possible anomic collapse.

78. Therefore, we ponder the essential direction of our existence afterwards, in our general observations and reflections.

79. The system of ethics is not devised to morally oppress our thoughts, but to conduce our mind to sensible propriety and acts of beneficence.

80. It is not a fundamental question, whether or not, we are corrupted or not, since the incidence of corruption is predominantly visible in its occurrence.

81. Thence, by our natural disposition or mien, we are conscious of the state of our active cognition that contributes to our physical and mental stability.

82. For that reason established, the concept of ethics is an intrinsic part of the commonality of the philosophical element of ethos.

83. Our time spent on our multifarious errors committed is a vivid example of the reversible nature of our actions that can be rectified with orientation.

84. At times, we react with incisive wit and observation. However, our conduct is judged on the evident demonstration of the actions taken.

85. If we were to make a broad description of ethos within our subjective analysis, we would start with the principles and practice of ethics.

86. It is an excellent or exceptional attribute to our character and respectability that reminds us of our affinity, with other human beings.

87. There is no doubt that we are conscious beings that react to our circumjacence, when we are constantly confronted, with different situations that are evolving.

88. The presence of ethics is a steady reminder of our cognisance, in an equable form and characterisation that best describes its process.

89. We are born with the innate ability to learn, yet it is the maturity of the process that develops then and becomes cognisant to our mind.

90. Once we have reached the stage of awareness, the clear distinction with ethical behaviour and unethical behaviour is magnified.

91. We can proceed to the understanding of how the moral guidance of proper ethics should be applied conscientiously.

92. If we were to scrutinise the cause and effect of our daily behaviour, then we could assume that there is an obvious pattern for this behaviourial trait.

93. To attempt to reconcile it with rationality would signify a protractive paradox of thoughts converged that are concatenated to the pattern of the action.

94. By admitting to this actual occurrence in the end, we are acknowledging the importance of ethos and its general evolution.

95. What is meant by its function is the mind's ability to coexist with the body and soul, within the operation that it corresponds to.

96. This apparent determination is focused, on the perception of our calculated actions and thoughts presented.

97. Without the application of ethics, we would be incapable of distinguishing what is right from wrong, within the semblance of the truth.

98. Ultimately, the status of our awareness contributes to the immediate actions of our comportment and the outcome is discerned, with the reaction taken.

99. Whatever we surmise as modesty is greatly superior to the inferiority of senseless hautein and callosity that does not reflect the concept of ethos.

100. The one thing that allows us to control our emotions and behaviour is the remarkable application of will.



1. The Oracle defines will, as the faculty of the mind which selects, at the moment of decision, the strongest desire from amongst the distinctive desires present.

2. Will does not refer to any particular desire generally, but rather to the established mechanism, for choosing from amongst one's desires.

3. Within philosophy our will is crucial as one of the unique parts of the mind, along with reason and understanding. It is considered central to the field of ethics, because of its role in enabling deliberate action.

4. In Book III Aristotle divided actions into three categories instead of two: Voluntary acts that are of our own volition and involuntary or unwilling acts, which are in the simplest case where people do not praise or blame. In such cases a person does not choose the wrong thing.

5. A person lacking self-mastery can have knowledge, but not an active knowledge that they are paying attention to.

6. Now, if we understand what was meant by Aristotle, then we can either conceive that the will of a person is completely dependent on that person's own will or that person's reluctance to do anything. Videlicet, that person chooses to do what that person desires to do or not to do.

7. Not everyone who stands firm on the basis of a rational and even correct decision has self-mastery emphasised Aristotle.

8. It is not relevant, if we use the word self-mastery or volition, instead of will in our terminology, when analysing the subject.

9. What is of essential relevance is the fact that we recognise the faculty and acknowledge its instrumental part in the configuration of ethos.

10. With this general admission, we are capable of using its immense power, to demonstrate our resolution overtly as philosophised.

11. In due time, we can apply this power to our mind and create a genuine method of ethics that we can adhere to efficaciously.

12. There is no intricacy in the matter, and its edification is an especial advantage of its preconception and acknowledgement.

13. Nothing is imposed upon us, if we decide to not permit its cogent imposition or its extemporaneous nature.

14. Consequently, the notion that we are impeded of it is not a philosophical question solely or an Aristotelian factor.

15. Our will manifests, within the prevalence of our emotions and thoughts continually, in their dispensation. It is the invisible force of the soul.

16. It accompanies the decision process and the emotional process also, in its progressive duration and completion.

17. We ascribe to the concept that the will is voluntary or involuntary in its desire and selection, within the conglomeration of the elements of philosophy.

18. Thus, every decision taken is conditioned to the ultimate determination of our will and has an illative consequence.

19. It is a necessity that cannot be ignored, on the argument that it is immaterial, since we are aware of its operational function, and we make the selection to express it.

20. We can debate the issue of the broader concept of what is free will, but that is better left for the teachings of psychology.

21. The subject that mostly concerns will with philosophy is the facet of its capacity and its possible imminution.

22. Our will has the full capacity to execute whatever logical goal or task we have and interchange ideas, amongst us.

23. Once more, it is the transparent quandary of what do I want to do or don't want to do?

24. Although there is an evident measure of logic to that asseveration, the determination is mostly associated, with ethos.

25. The Oracle is the moral guidance to ethos and a discernible reference, for its original validation and commitment.

26. Through my valid acceptance, I avow that there are many individuals that do not have the sufficient recognition of will to proceed its course.

27. They tend to ignore this optimal capability, with pretexts or thoughts to justify their demeanour and actions.

28. This errant belief only complicates the introspective nature of our surmisal and presupposition to believe in its capacity.

29. We establish ethics to our lives, so that we can have a stable balance that enables us to employ its concept, with a good measure of auturgy.

30. In order for that to transpire, we must truly recognise the vital role of moral conduct in the practice of ethos.

31. Naturally, we become better people, with the practice of ethics and avoid the senseless need, for our habitual hebetude and philotimia.

32. Philosophy teaches us, since the ancient days of Socrates and Plato, the concept of will that has been properly instructed and learnt.

33. Its actual interpretation is directly a matter of natural circumstance and participation that most persons eagerly attempt to reason with theory.

34. Perhaps the thought of being ignorant seems a harsh and vituperative word, yet it is ignorance that prevents our will to prosper.

35. It is a logical conclusion that needs no further elaboration or exetosis of a proemial nature, because ignorance is the worst of all of our unwanted defects.

36. Therefore, when and where do we notice the essential power of our will?

37. We notice it, when we are strong in our resolve and it begins to nourish the body, mind and soul.

38. Its primal effects are felt and sensed in a positive manner, as a generative principle attached to philosophy.

39. Where do we notice the range of the power of our will?

40. It is fully perceived in the soul, with a pistic conviction and notice that exceeds a metaphorical sense.

41. Just as with every symptom there is a clear manifestation that can be hypothesised, with a measure of probabiliorism.

42. If we ponder with a precise hypothetical analysis, then we would discover that the will is no different than the other properties of ethos.

43. Whilst desire is sometimes associated to it, in this concept of philosophy, there is an intelligible distinction made.

44. The known distinction is that desire is more aligned to the causation of feeling and the will to the system of ethics.

45. Thus, what we desire or impetrate is not what we cogitate in our thoughts always, and it can be an obviation of our individuality.

46. Instead, what inspires us does resemble our will and not our dedolent emotions that can result, in unconscionable thoughts.

47. The Oracle defines desire as a yearning and the will as resolution, because the attributes are separate in their meaning and value.

48. The formula to obtain its power is found in the desire to not desist, but insist in our determination and procinct.

49. If we insist with our persistence, then the likely outcome should be that the power of our will increases in magnitude.

50. The reward for this insisting method is internal strength and a steady disposition revealed that does not alter, into a mercurial temperament.

51. And all of which contribute to the magnificent harmony of the mind, body and soul, in a productive form of serendipity.

52. The objective of any form of philosophy is to be logical and functional, from its arche and its practical application.

53. In this manner, we achieve this main objective prudently, with such unambiguous caution and not imperceptibleness. We must understand the dynamicity of the will.

54. We use thought for knowledge and wisdom, but we use will for the demonstration of ethics and the eschewal of procacity.

55. Behaviour is a property of ethics that we cannot avoid, with an uninstructed ignorance or transparent apodictism.

56. If we were to make the general contrast, between ethos and the other elements of philosophy, then we would find that ethos is the model that we should strive for diligently.

57. It is quite healthy and efficient, in its practice and interposition of variable concepts that are representative of philosophy.

58. There are more advantages than there are more disadvantages that are clearly demonstrated in time and acknowledgement.

59. However, we have the foolish tendency to forget this reality, because of our developing insipience and propeteia.

60. If we made the analysis that without will, we would still have our ethical behaviour, then it would be not pointless to exempt the extrication of the argument.

61. With enough vigour, we discover that there is an exact finalisation of our resolution and intellectual rhapsody.

62. At variance, the will of a human being is deserving of its superb connotation and implementation, because it allows the mind to function with it.

63. We can choose to then acknowledge the signification of its powerful capacity, irrespective of the nature of its contribution.

64. I believe that this is not irrelevant, because our mind, body and soul have volition to guide it, within a presumable direction that is not minatory.

65. Therefore, the intensification of the meaning of this indiscreet declaration is to perceive the mental faculties we possess.

66. Philosophy teaches us that our will is composed of a tangible characteristic and defiance that symbolises our true character.

67. From amongst the insuperable barriers that we confront daily, there is an instrumental effect that instantaneously comforts us.

68. That tantalising effect produced is primarily known to our perception, as our will and not its terrible negation.

69. It is not insufficient and it is inspirational, in its motivation and substance conveyed, through rationalisation.

70. To make the insinuation that the mind controls the body is not a frivolous asseveration of the truth, especially when it is scientifically acknowledged.

71. There are sceptics that will confute the innovative effort and efficiency of the Oracle, as a source of great insolubility.

72. Nonetheless, what is predictable, about the Oracle is the inimitable nature of its incredible induction and illumination.

73. Thus, we have an unusual intimation of the capacity of our inherent will to react to distinctive adversities and conflicts.

74. The infusion of thoughts permits the consideration of the mind to facilitate the will inexpressibly, within a manner that is understood.

75. We tend to test it, under inauspicious moments or with our inadvertence and necessity, so that we are cognisant of its effect.

76. Whether it is an inescapable motive or deliberate effort, we use the power of our will to react to certain situations.

77. It is highly crucial and remarkable at the same time that we experience the wonders of ethos, through our desideratum.

78. Our primitive thoughts often assist us in the construct of an immersed process that develops our willful needs.

79. When those needs are confirmed, the will begins to become invigorated and receptive to the progression of our thoughts.

80. We are instructed to adhere to it and propose a firm establishment of its inclusion based, on the instrument of philosophy.

81. It is not necessarily indicative of our physicality or intellect, instead of the inclination that reveals our persistence.

82. If we are resolute to conquer our visible fears and doubts, then we must strengthen and empower our will, with the concepts of philosophy.

83. From an amalgamation of our amenable actions, we are conscious of our renewable fortitude to resist the delirifacient effects of our instability.

84. It is at the incipient stage of our evolution that we make the discovery of the degree of our mental and emotional exertion at intervals.

85. What this implies is the process of our awareness and the occurrence of our irresistible determination and precision.

86. Is it not simplistic to apply a belief that promotes the optimum state of mind that is productive?

87. What we presume to be understood primarily is often, not the response that we seek with our assiduity and candour.

88. There is an invariable urge to indagate the most complicated aspect of our lives, yet we are feckless, if we do not impose will.

89. Its actual function is a requisite that accompanies our general restraint and restriction, in order that we not deviate from the path of ethos.

90. Ethos is an inveterate element of this philosophy that we aspire to emulate its fulfilment and establish its importance.

91. Acrasia is the inverse of volition and the reason of our inventive and ineffaceable predicaments and ongoing dilemmas.

92. We examine then, the consequential effect of the will introspectively and studiously, with the pattern of our thoughts.

93. And from the interposition of ethos, we interpret the notion of its definition and inculcation, since the awareness of those developing thoughts.

94. The noticeable illumination of the mind is imperative to the betterment of the will and our plerophory.

95. By using it, we illustrate the immutable impact of its capacity in the exactitude of its functional potency and deliverance.

96. It is not an imaginatory exaggeration to assert the relativity of the will implicitly, with a proper analysis deduced.

97. It is not exceedingly incompossible to admit that it governs coincidentally, with the power of our mind at intervals.

98. Hence, the exceptional manner that it controls at times, the mind is interchangeable and produces the corroboration between them.

99. Therefore, it is no exclamatory remark to surmise and describe, with this philosophy the state and resolve of our will.

100. Our will is meaningless and not accountable, if we do not believe in duty.



1. The Oracle defines duty, as the commitment or expectation to perform some action.

2. Duty may occur from a foundation of ethics or morality, especially in a respected culture. Many duties are based created by law, sometimes including a codified punishment or liability for non-performance. Performing one's duty may require some sacrifice of self-interest.

3. Cicero, an early Roman philosopher who discussed duty in his work "On Duty", suggested that duties can come from four different sources.

4. It is a result of one's personal character, or as a result of one's own moral expectations for oneself, within the pattern of thought.

5. The specific duties that are imposed by law or culture considerably, depend on jurisdiction, religion, and social norms.

6. There is an important factor of duty that should be understood, as a pivotal element of ethos that cannot be dismissed, as an inobligality.

7. It is for the betterment of society and the values of the democracy that we either impose or inherit, with the principles of logic. It is the personification of our character.

8. Our duty is to succour the poor and the voices of the volgivagant people outcast by society, through our supererogatory deeds and sodality.

9. We have not progressed sufficiently, as a society to understand the necessity of our duties to the extent that we require the assistance of cognisance.

10. Thus, the notion of duty is not practical, if the cause is not rewarding or justifiable in the end, when we apply it to our decisions.

11. If we could measure our acts of truthful piety compared to our duty, then we would discover how different the comparison would be in nature.

12. An act of piety is reflective of the intention of that act, whilst a pious act of devotion demonstrates the degree of the religious devotion that overshadows the simple reference of that pious act.

13. Therefore, the act is considered a duty, when it is not incumbent, because of praise, but of the solemnity of the act.

14. Philosophy indicates the importance of duty, and from it, we can surmise the plausible concept of ethos and kathekon.

15. Truly, to acknowledge its role in ethos is to realise its reliable function and its extent, with our acts of munificence and deonticity.

16. To be benevolent and dutiful is to be humble and reverent in nature and not in the captious nature of surquedry.

17. The actual recognition of those particular traits of our disposition is the acceptance of our duty, with its instructional utility.

18. With the admission of what we regard and comprehend it to mean, the concept of responsibility is introduced into the discussion.

19. The general argument is that with duty comes responsibility that we must be prepared to confront, with its integration in our lives.

20. It is an earnest responsibility that we either accept or ignore its entirety, irrespective of its undeniable consequence.

21. To serve the greater cause is to be dutiful and charitable. To serve the lesser cause is to be selfish and callous.

22. Egoism is the greatest reminder of the worse of all vices that vitiate us and is inherently detrimental to our health and mind.

23. It is centred, around the identity that wields dominion over us and feeds our uncontrollable ego and incorrigible habits.

24. Our failure to recognise that distinct oddity within us is forever our internal struggle and plight that is present in our mind.

25. Until we have reached the fulfilment of that accomplishment, we are basically serving our own interest and not philanthropy.

26. Duty is to always serve others, before oneself, and without a doubt there can be nothing nobler of a cause than to serve the need of a present community.

27. A community cannot properly function, if there is no true will to serve that community and its active members.

28. There must be a firm system of belief that morally guides our community and society, within a practical structure.

29. That robust system is acknowledged as ethics and is the alligation to our idoneous actions and kudos esteemed by our acceptance.

30. We can take into strong consideration the inclusion of will and judgement, in the pattern of our thoughts and actions.

31. However, if we do not apply the capacity of thought, then the function is pointless and the cause would be even more.

32. The unforgettable cause must ever be greater than the thought of one man or one selective principle aspired.

33. The task may seem daunting and improbable, nevertheless, it is admirable in completion and prominent in stature.

34. What we can achieve through our effort is the success of our accomplishment that offers us the notion of triumph.

35. Our will and determination are the predominant factors that form that correlation, and therefore it proceeds to the level of our consciousness.

36. And from that essential correlation mentioned, we then gain the seed of knowledge and obtain the wonder of wisdom.

37. The necessary knowledge and wisdom to provide us the fundamentals of ethos to be conversant, in the deontic matter.

38. These considerable fundamentals are thereafter used by us to guide our pattern of behaviour and actions.

39. We are inquisitive in nature and thus, we are constantly pondering and searching for immediate answers.

40. This thought process is attached to our conduct and is prevalent in the decisions and actions we have introduced.

41. Our conduct must have moral guidance and a duty to serve as its rationale, against the influence of moral decadence.

42. Its noble purpose is the pursuit of a cause that is greater than our singular interest or desire.

43. No interest can be more meaningful than the preservation of our beliefs and their promulgation.

44. And that is the principal reason we must strive to prosper in that endeavour and initiative, so that we are mindful of those beliefs.

45. Ethos is not only a basis of thought, but is an ethical system of comportment that is not inconsiderable to the mind or the polemics of reason.

46. No one is born with ethics. It is an instructed teaching and learning that provides us with its necessary benefits.

47. There is so much to understand of humanity, as there is so little time to find the answers to our questions.

48. Whether we decide to embrace, the concept of ethics is entirely unpredictable and personal in our selectivity of its concept.

49. We can ultimately choose to accept it or merely disregard its function and importance in our lives.

50. Society must determine, if mankind is prepared enough to follow the civility of ethics and not the macrology of fanciful philodoxes.

51. I believe that the benefit outweighs the uncertainty of that internal society that remains indeterminable and unestablished.

52. Every aspect of philosophy has a logical premise and explanation concluded that is, not any form of an incomprehensible obsolescence.

53. It is either logical or illogical in its comparison and task and cannot be dismissed, as a mere computation of the mind.

54. The precepts of ethos have been for centuries revered and imitable, by the governance of manifold societies.

55. Where virtue is the ultimate reward sought, duty is the basis of that conventional concept and noticeable generalisation.

56. The Oracle attests to the practicality of duty and virtue, as the crucial elements of this extraordinary property.

57. It is not for the Oracle to prove or disprove the notion of ethos or offer a representation of its effect and nature.

58. Its significant purpose is to serve humanity, in whatever capacity proposed and designed to offer the mind answers.

59. Any viable structure of reasonable implementation must be governed, by reasonable thoughts.

60. Axiology is said to contribute to the intrinsic value of ethos, but can there be a more sufficient theory to denote the value of our consciousness?

61. Duty is an inspirational task that we assume, with the utmost efficiency and reliance, when we are aware of its contribution.

62. We become intuitive, with our altruistic devotion demonstrated in loyalty and integrity.

63. Thus, the impressionable worth of its usage is existent, in the indefinite nature of its involvement.

64. There is a preconception that we preclude with insistence that duty is not a prime necessity or an apodictical value.

65. We can argue that our instinctive behaviour, at a preconcerted occasion is not always compatible to that notion.

66. Within our predisposition its institutional concept is then accentuated, in the form of its implementation.

67. The preferment in our occupation is an example of the instructive part of ethos that is propelled, by a propitious ambition we display.

68. To be assigned a task is a deducible evidence of our preparatory temperance and obedience.

69. It is not the prevarication of the concept that we must temporise, but its imperious manner of an exigency.

70. Duty when executed is the experimentation of a prospective outcome that we are conscious of its immediate relevance.

71. The Oracle recognises its benefit and offers its fruition, as a reasonable reward and integration.

72. There is much about the concept of duty that is based, on the signs of our perception and recognition.

73. How we procure its effect is transparent in the effort we provide and acknowledge.

74. With the sense of great accomplishment, we learn the true value of ethos and its sedulity.

75. Thus, we become more mindful of the attainment of its perficient practice and method.

76. Our society is founded, on the fundamental basis of service and contribution that serves, as an inspiration.

77. The attribute of duty is seen, in the demonstrative character we display seemingly, with the agathon of our deeds.

78. When we express this endeavour, we are consciously aware of its significant meaning.

79. The main requirement of its purport is the rudimental element of its conception or origin.

80. Our lives are governed by our precise thoughts, actions and behaviour daily disclosed.

81. Without an unquestionable dubiety, our spirit of community and brethren is forever imparted in our teaching.

82. We are taught to exemplify the noble traits of our labour and dedication, through our proficiency.

83. Gradually, it is a recourse that summons us to that reverent demonstration.

84. Until, we have effectuated this efficaciously, then our actions of loyalty are fruitless.

85. No act of duty can be fully understood as admirable, if we do not exhibit commitment, within a qualitative state of action.

86. As we reach maturity in age, we address issues that are much more problematic and pressing.

87. If we suppose that we are obligated to perform a duty, then what responsibility would be shared, if that duty was contradictory in its aspiration?

88. That is the reason that the action that we take is defined, as moral or immoral in nature.

89. Whatever intention we have for our general motivation is congruous to the onus that we bear as people.

90. And the acquisition of this motivation presents our immense fidelity to any pledge or undertaking.

91. The concept of sacrifice of self-interest may manifest, in the form of civicism or our various expectations.

92. Usually, the commitment imposed is not necessarily, an indicator of an inadequate influence that has manifested.

93. We can debate the concept of deontology and compare it to the intimation of our devoirs.

94. What we would presumably discover is the pragmatism of that decisive realisation.

95. This would conclude a ratiocinatory observation of what duty constitutes in essence.

96. In the broader concept, the traditions we uphold are periodically attached to this obeisance.

97. The principle that we adhere to guide us in morality is simple and invariant in its affirmation.

98. Our affinity with this affiliation of ethos is not inconceivable to the elements of this philosophy.

99. Every argument commenced must have a logical surmisal that is conclusive in its basis and argument.

100. Therefore, that is the principle reason that duty requires the criterion of justice.



1. The Oracle defines justice, as the attainment of that which is just and the philosophical discussion of that which is just in its nature.

2. The concept of justice is based on numerous fields, and many differing viewpoints and perspectives including the concepts of moral correctness based on ethics, rationality, law, religion, equity and fairness.

3. The general discussion of justice is divided into the realm of social justice as found in philosophy, theology and religion, and, procedural justice as found in the study and application of the law.

4. In his dialogue Republic, Plato uses Socrates to argue for justice that discusses both the just person and the just City State. Justice is a proper, harmonious relationship, between the warring parts of the person or city. Hence, Plato's definition of justice is that justice is the having and doing of what is one's own. A just man is a man in just the right place, doing his best and giving the precise equivalent of what he has received.

5. This applies both at the individual level and at the universal level. A person's soul has three parts-reason, spirit and desire. Similarly, a city has three parts-Socrates uses the parable of the chariot to illustrate his point: a chariot works as a whole because the two horses' power is directed by the charioteer. Lovers of wisdom-philosophers, in one sense of the term-should rule because only they understand what is good. If one is ill, one goes to a medic rather than a farmer, because the medic is expert in the subject of health. Similarly, one should trust one's city to an expert in the subject of the good, not to a mere politician who attempts to gain power by giving people what they want, rather than what's good for them in return.

6. Socrates used the parable of the ship to illustrate this point: the unjust city is like a ship in open ocean, crewed by a powerful but drunken captain (the common people), a group of untrustworthy advisers who try to manipulate the captain into giving them power over the ship's course (the politicians), and a navigator (the philosopher) who is the only one who knows how to get the ship to port. For Socrates, the only way the ship would reach its destination-the good-is if the navigator took charge.

7. The advocates of divine authority and theory argue that justice, and indeed the whole of morality, is the authoritative command of God. Therefore religious justice is implemented in the concept of punishment to refer to the cogent condemnation of God, within the determination of the Heaven or Hell, for each and all human beings.

7. In accordance to the analogy of religion God's thorough assessment of a person's worth: a determination of "good" conveys a great value, whilst "evil" conveys the opposite, a worthless significance that is contradictory to good.

8. In the belief of philosophy, justice is a relative part of the concept and formation of ethos. It is the enforcer of our accountability. The Greek philosophers emphasised the distinction between nature on the one hand and law, custom, or convention on the other. What the law commanded would be expected to vary from place to place, but what was "by nature" should be the same everywhere. A "law of nature" would thereafter have the pattern more of a paradox than something that obviously existed previously.

9. Plato and Aristotle, posited the existence of natural justice or natural right, in conformity to its social and political relevance. According to Aristotle the universal law is the law of Nature. For verily there is, as every one to some extent divines, a natural justice and injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other.

10. When we proceed to establish a form of justice to adhere to its principles, we require the faculty of our judgement to distinguish, from the agathokakological difference.

11. We must be mindful of the state of mind in which someone acts against their better judgement, through the weakness of will that is called acrasia.

12. Socrates once said, "I cannot teach anybody anything. I can only make them think".

13. His words expressed were meant for the ability to obtain judgement, through the application of thought. Thus, justice could be transmitted through that pattern of thought.

14. Justice is what we contemplate and attempt to resolve afterwards, with our indicative reflection. It is the conception of justice that is the virtue of the soul and injustice its vice.

15. We are better human beings with it than, without its important role, in our actions and its decisions. Justice is the ideal form of perfection in human relationships. And the spirit which encourages men in the proper discharge of their duties. The promotion of balance and harmony in thought and action was pre-eminently social in character. Nature was the source of law, and the duty of the state was simply considered to be the application rather than the creation of the law. Aristotle and Plato's justice, both were complementary to each other and the aim of both philosophers was to find a principle of capacity through which, unity, harmony, virtue and happiness could be established in our societies.

16. It is critical in our process of ethos, and we depend on its signate effect to form our quotidian decisions and measures of calculated actions.

17. It defines the extraordinary realm and scope of our universal wisdom and knowledge, when utilised to enforce the state of impartiality.

18. The action taken by the deemers of justice is conditioned to the judgement of our thoughts and the justice that is provided.

19. What we ponder the most is not often, what needs to be addressed, through our noesis and comprehension, as we are contemplating the multiple forms of justice.

20. In the concept of ethos, philosophy indicates that we are responsible for our actions, when those actions are reasonable and not irresponsible. Ergo, we must assume our culpability, when we are errant in our decisions.

21. And from these deliberate actions, we assume that the correlative nature of our thought and action produces the justice that is warranted under the laws of nature or man.

22. The type of justice that requires the proper decision and notice of the developing situation that has concluded, in the procedure selected.

23. An arbitrary decision is no better than a speculative insinuation, when the result of that decision is imperative to the thought manifest and its consequence.

24. To be prudent is to be aware of that consequence, and to be thoughtless is to be mistaken in our judgement.

25. Accuracy is not measured by how precise the thought is, but how effective is that evolving thought, when administrating justice.

26. If my actual cognisance and knowledge were not aware of each other or the thought applied, then my sound judgement would be inhibited by that action.

27. There would be no absolute clarity in my decision at all, and my thoughts would be devoid of any plausibility to apply or receive justice.

28. And that is the main reason that ethos is a rational exponent of philosophy and of the Oracle, because it is intrinsic to the justice that we seek to impose.

29. It teaches people, the immediate necessity to learn the contrast and signification from, what is right from wrong, within our moral guidance.

30. Until this lesson is learnt, human beings will never comprehend the true message of that moral guidance and adherence.

31. Thus, we shall be lost in our plentiful thoughts and judgement, if we do not possess proper moral guidance in our lives to implement a system of impartial justice.

32. We shall be confined in the process that has evolved, into a circumstantial obfuscation and eloignment that deviate, from the partiality of any form of justice.

33. If we cannot determine, what is morally right from wrong, then how are we to distinguish a thought from an idea, when there is no judgement acquired?

34. The induced requirement of it is paramount, in the function of its operation and message, if we are to proceed to use justice in our argument for a punitive action.

35. There can be no doubt that without sound judgement, our thoughts are merely futile and obacerated.

36. This futility creates the uncertainty that disrupts our reactionary actions of justice if provoked.

37. The cogent argument for ethos is sound judgement and resolution evinced by justice, through the aspect of logic.

38. Sceptics can conclude that it is more of a lawful argumentation than philosophical, but philosophy discusses the essence or substance of justice.

39. We can debate the premise for each belief and contingency in our prolepsis, but there must exist a pattern for it.

40. The wonder of the Oracle is the universal knowledge and wisdom it offers to the reader and of the interpretation of philosophy.

41. There is no need to proscribe by law the teaching of philosophy, if we are unable to adhere to its idoneous practice.

42. A practice that had evolved, into the basic principles of democracy and allowed persons to become polyhistors and administrators of laws.

43. As we reach the pinnacle of knowledge, we also reach the optimal stage of our mind and its amplitude, when we devise our laws of justice.

44. Justice is the imperative course to our decision making in every capacity predicted in the lawful and natural sense.

45. No one is immune from the thorough process of justice that develops afterwards and becomes more pellucid with duration.

46. If we can surmise the feasibility of its original meaning, then we can easily determine the path of sound judgement that is necessary to appeal to the fundamentals of justice.

47. This certain path is something from absolutely nothing that does not become a villiority, if we apply our aperçu to obtain its significance.

48. Thus, if our mind cannot process the difference, between logical and illogical, then there would be no certainty or evidence of its involvement in that justifiable process.

49. Humanity would be worse off with its inusitation, if it had no moral guidance to follow, as one of its practical consuetudes.

50. We are intuitively aware of the presence of logos in our lives and how it effects the facility of ethos.

51. There are so many thoughts and actions that are attributed to philosophy and a metempirical nature.

52. And so much of our thoughts and actions in justice correspond, with proactive judgement and not underestimation.

53. Honesty within the universal truth is the commencement of that fascinating evolution that progresses into judgement.

54. To error is not inconclusive to the sole criterion of the belief of ethos. It is to error and be ignorant of its importance.

55. A considerable significance that could be agreed is of a noticeable recognition and acceptation, in respect to the method of its usage.

56. This unique recognition can be established, within the ascribed concept of philosophy that the ancient philosophers of Greece aspired to teach, with their knowledge and wisdom.

57. Justice is a clear element of ethos that characterises the format of which we acknowledge, as a form of percipience.

58. What we learn from it depends, on the perceptible observation we impose afterwards, when applying our justice.

59. Each component of this philosophy is intended to resolve the intricacies of human interaction and its correlation to our mind, body and soul.

60. Justice is the realistic combination of our thoughts and actions that are expressed, in our attitude and decisions.

61. Our sentience along with percipience and sapience assist in our judgement and logical refutations necessary to deal, with the intricacies of justice.

62. There are rare occasions, when our thoughts can gorgonise us and becloud our mind, in an ineluctable manner of concision and protervity.

63. A staid mien gives the sole impression that our perspicacious mind is of an improvidence in nature.

64. The mind is prone to subtle adversity and decision-making, in a prepense action and manner that is required, for any implementation of justice.

65. We can acknowledge justice to be understood, as part of our system of laws that are ascertained by our active acumen is not an inaccurate presupposition.

66. Our behaviour is conduced, by the completion of our ideas and validity of ethics. Therefore, this would imply the need for justice.

67. Within the putative concept of this elaborated philosophy, there is an expatiation of the truth that is explainable.

68. As people we are defined, with an expectant behaviour of propriety, yet we are exposed to draconian measures of social discipline that are acrasial and dedolent.

69. When we use our judgement for justice, we imbibe from the knowledge that is a broad compilation of facts or theories that are not comprised of pseudo thoughts or unfounded conjectures.

70. Once we have established the basis of that notion, the actions we take are accordingly to our discernment and ability to be correct and not incorrect.

71. The judicious generalisation of the relativity of the mind is deciphered, by the expediency of the thought elicited.

72. In philosophy, we are taught of the ego and seity, within a Delphic interpretation and an orphic explanation.

73. If we can attempt to comprehend the vicissitudes of the mind, then we could efface any caustic reproof or platitude that is immaterial.

74. If we achieve a puissant mind, then the incorrigible habit of our errant nature can be rectified, by our correct judgement for justice.

75. All forms of belief must have a foundation that serves, as an allegorical reference and inference to the need for its function.

76. Ethos is the actual application that develops our judgement and loyalty for justice, with superb efficiency.

77. The Oracle is not the viduous vagaries of a tenuous representation of philosophy that ultracrepidates, through dogmatism.

78. Its purpose is to expand our mind and thoughts, in prevention of its immediate desuetude and discontinuation.

79. Judgement is the cause to our actions, as emotions to the pattern of our behaviour. Therefore, justice is the enforcer of that judgement.

80. Why we rely on this essential property of ethos is mainly a logical premise accentuated in justice.

81. We must distinguish from the state of corruption and moral guidance, in order to establish its concept and purpose.

82. Corruption is the vile action of a derivative circumstance that elicits the impurity of the mind, body and soul, periclitating our purity in an incicurable manner of injustice.

83. We can choose the obvious adherence of moral conduct or immoral corruption, with our decisions and actions.

84. What is being mentioned is not the extenuating circumstances of a diatribe or the expostulation of this philosophy, instead the rudiment of our comportment.

85. We are by nature, people of fallibility and often resort to bad judgement and behavioural acts of crime that are merely reprehensible.

86. Henceforth, the relation between ethics and judgement is compounded by the fact that our society must be governed, by a reasonable system of precepts.

87. This is where the faculty of philosophy promotes the authentic state of ethos, with such clarity and definition.

88. It is indeed imperative to acknowledge the correlative nature of justice with ethos and understand the criminal aspect of our acts.

89. There is a certain aspect of justice within philosophy that we prescribe the notion of its introduction and instruction.

90. The basic contrast between philosophy, science and religion is the application interposed and the understanding of that application.

91. Gradually, we learn to develop the quintessence of our character, through the specific deliberation of our judgement.

92. This confirms the importance of the recognition of ethos and its continual involvement with the Oracle.

93. The result is contingent to the evolution of our effort and our judgement demonstrated, with the distinctive forms of justice applied.

94. The concept of ethics forms the basis of the precedence and laws of our society and governments that are material to justice.

95. Without it, we cannot proceed to the whole understanding of judgement and its informative finality.

96. A finality that is the pending need to conclude that our ability can differentiate the verisimilitude, within the concept of justice and injustice.

97. Every argument of this philosophy concurs, with the veracity of the information presented in details.

98. Our will and determination are combined factors that are fairly attributed to our known persistence and objectives.

99. The mere possibility of an accomplishment of this vivid realisation is sufficient to inspire us to succeed with our established laws.

100. Justice is one of those aspects of ethos that our societies base their necessary fundamentals, but it requires the observance of virtue.



1. The Oracle defines virtue, as a trait or quality that is deemed to be morally good and thus is valued, as a foundation of principle and good moral being.

2. The four classic cardinal virtues described are temperance: prudence, courage, and justice.

3. In Protagoras and Meno, for example, Plato stated that the separate virtues could not exist independently and offers as evidence the contradictions of acting with wisdom, yet in an unjust way; or acting with fortitude yet without wisdom.

4. In his work Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined a virtue as a point, between a deficiency and an excess of a trait. The point of greatest virtue lies not in the exact middle, but at a golden mean sometimes closer to one extreme than the other.

5. The same rationale was expressed by Plato in Meno, when he wrote that people only act in ways that they perceive will bring them maximum good. It is the lack of wisdom that results in the making of a bad choice instead of a prudent one.

6. The connotation of virtue is often construed, in a different manner and archtype in philosophy than in religion.

7. Whilst the significance and concept are mutually in concurrence with each other, the properties are vastly different.

8. Philosophy agrees that there is no greater reward than virtue, but in Christianity the three theological virtues are faith, hope and charity.

9. Its purport in this interpretative induction is the cause to which humanity should strive to fulfill in ethos.

10. Subsequently, the relation between logos and ethos is of a great value and function. Virtue is the worth of the universal soul. In Plato's Republic the following forms are attached to virtue.

11. Temperance is the primary moderation that gives us forbearance and principle.

12. Prudence is the necessary restraint that guides our awareness.

13. Courage is the immense fortitude that protects our belief.

14. Justice is the immeasurable cause that provides retribution.

15. From these elements mentioned, we construct the basic concept of what is to us virtue.

16. Virtue must always be governed, by these priscan principles that we depend on for its motivation and arete.

17. If not, there would be no actual justification, for the practical implementation of its usage. Aristotle said, "Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit".

18. We define ourselves as people of virtue, yet we are unable to adhere to its instrumental effect and truth. "Life is an unfoldment, and the further we travel the more truth we can comprehend. To understand the things that are at our door is the best preparation for understanding those that lie beyond," quoth Hypatia.

19. Nothing seems suitable, without the discipline of moral conduct to guide us, in our observable journey of philosophy.

20. Our societies and our democracies elicit the praise of virtue, within the different belief systems selected. Aristotle believed in the virtues of voluntary action, deliberate choice, weakness of the will, friendship, and achieving happiness.

21. It has been attached to the history and evolution of our humanity, since its original inception. Socrates stated virtue could be taught. He believed that the unexamined life wasn't worth living. One must seek knowledge and wisdom before private interests.

22. It is the aretaic pillar of the state of moral excellence that we strive to emulate with perfection.

23. How we procure its attainment is the question that at times, eludes our unaware consciousness.

24. To attempt to consolidate the main principle of its precept is to acknowledge its veracity and not condone its misinterpretation.

25. The clarity of that argument is seen, in the truth of its purpose and its paragon perceived.

26. The common notion of virtue is to obtain the procurement of ethics and our sophrosyne.

27. What we establish as foundation in our thoughts and emotions is connective to the relativity of our demeanour.

28. Thereafter, once we have reached that objective, we can demonstrate a pattern of a conduct of equity.

29. From this system of behaviour, we respond to the things and situations that interest or perplex us the most.

30. Verily, it is comparative to the laws that govern our societies and our distinct concepts and precepts.

31. Our societies require the provision of laws and adherence to govern, but virtue is the aspect of ethics that is mostly mentioned.

32. We can be governed by the laws of man and governed as well, by the laws of philosophy.

33. As with the principle of law, there is a viable structure formed to comply, with our moral guidance.

34. To be virtuous does not imply the hyperbolic sense of being religious or chaste.

35. What it signifies is to acknowledge a logical premise to establish and apply that transcends mere dogmatism.

36. One that exemplifies the precept of ethos that corresponds to the meaning of arete.

37. Human beings perceive, as they are cognisant and active in the mind's ability to any form of mental or visual perception.

38. When we are at that state of awareness, we then involve the participation of consideration.

39. It is a simple consideration to ascertain the haeccity of virtue and its plausible convenience.

40. We can either decide to follow a moral guidance or ignore the inducement to its enlightenment and henotic benefits.

41. The sense of enormous accomplishment is a common experience of our quiddative lives.

42. There is nothing more deserving than the satisfaction of that worthy accomplishment.

43. To be virtuous is to be modest and to not be haughty, or is it a deficient element to espouse with incredulity.

44. Hauteur is not a property that should be associated to pride or understood as acceptable.

45. Pride is measured by a satisfactory accomplishment and hauteur, by a pleasure of conceit.

46. We cannot recognise this distinction, unless we experiment this contrast of nature.

47. Virtue is the basis of our moral equilibrium and it provides us, with the requisite of its application.

48. It is the essential thing that describes our human disposition or personality developed.

49. It cannot be gained by mere intelligence, but by the emergence of universal knowledge and wisdom.

50. The same knowledge and wisdom that is linked to other aspects of ethos that have been specified before.

51. Ethos is the common principle of philosophy that has been fundamentally present, in our ancient and modern societies.

52. It has given humanity the opportunity of enlightening our thoughts in moral guidance.

53. Plato had realised that, because virtue was synonymous with wisdom it could be taught, a possibility he had earlier discounted. He then added, "correct belief" as an alternative to knowledge, proposing that knowledge is solely a correct belief that has been thought through and "tethered".

54. His profound interpretation of virtue and wisdom was a central point to how Western societies developed afterwards.

55. We can surmise that the philosophy of the ancient Greeks was reasonably efficient in its analysis of virtue.

56. Since it is known that both Plato and Aristotle, in particular, were exponents of it, their interpretations were meticulously examined.

57. Virtue has also formed an intrinsic part in several forms of religion and idealisation.

58. Its attribute to philosophy is clearly definite in this remarkable context. "The most virtuous are those who content themselves with being virtuous, without seeking to appear so."

59. Thus, it is the precise acknowledgement of that attribute that precisely rewards the merit and not the philautic act.

60. Ultimately, what matters is the important interpretation of our perception of virtue.

61. It is said with frequency that patience is an immense virtue that cannot succumb to the steresis of its validity.

62. It does not have an equivalent comparison, in regard to its universal signification.

63. Therefore, the explanatory part of virtue is exemplified, in the immensity of its value.

64. Truly, it is this specific value that we appreciate in its reliable presumption and construe.

65. There is no incredulity in our virtuous strife to seek the absolute betterment of the soul.

66. The soul's appeasement is an indefinable token of our empathy towards fulfilment.

67. When virtue is claimed as paramount to ethos it is due to the fact that our moral guidance has been virtually applied.

68. We create the concept that to be noble, we must first realise the implication of its definition.

69. It is a superb quality to be revered, with such admiration, admission and amelioration. Socrates said, "Contentment is natural wealth. Luxury is artificial poverty."

70. Since we are conscious of our characteristics, then we are able to demonstrate the benevolence of our soul, regardless of our impoverished status. In philosophy it is better to be impoverished in status than in the soul.

71. In order to effectuate this demonstration, we have to be mindful of our conscience.

72. It is the core of the human conscience that determines the nature of our actions and progress.

73. If we can distinguish the precise concept of being immoral from being moral within philosophy, thus, the adaptation to that concept becomes more perceptible.

74. Virtue is the modest form of our human conscience exposed, within its inherent peculiarity.

75. Everything that is speculated about our virtuous deeds is merely a general reflection of our character.

76. We enable our thoughts and actions to be guided, by the state of our mind and soul that is not frangible.

77. When we realise that our mien is being questioned, we ponder the consequence that ensues.

78. Nothing is defined as perfect, except the word itself, with its seeming intimation and meaning.

79. Perfection is not a reasonable thing achieved and is regarded, as an insipid vainglory and exoptable prevenancy.

80. Virtue has always been compatible to the principles of Greek philosophy that have amalgamated its concepts.

81. Its origin has been compatible also to the adherence of its general practice and usage.

82. The Oracle refers to virtue, as a natural and logical premise that is exemplified in philosophy.

83. The attribute itself is noble and meaningful in its veridic composition and worth.

84. Nonetheless, to be virtuous does not preclude irrationality, if that individual has strayed from ethos.

85. The seeming probability that we can stray from moral guidance is not unpredictable, as it would seem.

86. It is a normal occurrence that implies the lack of discipline in people that is easily an oversight.

87. A quandary does not occur, if there is not a mere problem in the first place to address.

88. Thus, the prolongation of our awareness is heightened, by our irresponsible actions taken.

89. Virtue is the property we have been apprised of its practical moderation and symbolism.

90. Then, it can be simplified, within the element of its actual representation and utilisation.

91. The Oracle does not define virtue or virtuousness, as a pristine form of chastity, as with religion.

92. It does not require that hyperbolic form of connotation or desitive attachment professed.

93. Instead, what is exemplified in this philosophy is the procurement of an ethical system of behaviour.

94. The addition of properties elucidated allows the concept to be understood, as relevant.

95. There is a certain pattern to ethos that corresponds to the perspective of philosophy.

96. Logic of which we apply is the mechanism that provides us a singular pattern of intelligible reason.

97. To have faith in philosophy does not equate to the measure of zealous devotion or fanaticism.

98. Devotion is an abstract word that is a meaningless word, when describing this philosophical concept.

99. Worship is an unnecessary attachment, since the inception of virtue is centered, on the basis of our modesty in the soul than the absolute purity of the body.

100. And from that simplistic point, we seek to obtain the consecutive path to dignity.



1. The Oracle defines dignity, as the right of an individual to be valued and respected for their own sake, and to be treated ethically.

2. It is of great importance in morality, ethics, law and government, as an extension of enlightenment, and the concepts of inherent and inalienable rights.

3. "Let parents bequeath to their children, not riches, but the spirit of reverence," quoth Plato.

4. Dignity is an inflexible principle that we strive to fulfill to a great degree and desire always. It is the ultimate merit of human accomplishments.

5. It is common that we seek it, amidst the hour of need and solace, when we are confronted with the issue of our character.

6. All human beings are deserving of a quantum of dignity in their lives than attainture and misfortune.

7. It needs no form of obligation, instead it is a state of reverence that mankind has evoked, with passion.

8. Any person can possess this quality, if that person decides conscientiously to embrace its actual concept and not attribute it to irreverence.

9. What matters is that we apply its use in the practice of its purport and form of utility consistently.

10. Life is a complexity that we must confront quotidianly, with its contrasting assuefactions and complications.

11. There is a state of being esteemed that we aspire to acquire its fruition and distinguishable acclaim.

12. It is the main essence that describes the manner indicative of dignity and reflects its pattern and representation.

13. Dignity is a general token of respect that is mostly admired and is call solemnity.

14. From this solemnity, we discover the intrinsic nature of the character of an individual.

15. Aristotle said, "Dignity does not consist in possessing honours, but in deserving them."

16. He also said, "The man who is truly good and wise will bear with dignity whatever fortune sends and will always make the best of his circumstances."

17. The indisputable truth in those consequential words is found, within the decision elaborated after the fact.

18. The demonstrative sign of dignity is the praxis and the practical confirmation of ethos that we adhere to its definition.

19. No measure of it can be experimented, without the discipline and administration of self-awareness.

20. The Oracle attests that the reason for philosophy is the absolute affirmation of the universal truth and its different elements.

21. We can think of it, as the selected choice for respect or belief that is superseded, by either of those two variables.

22. Therefore, the relation with its function and its necessity is twofold and germane in its involvement.

23. On one hand, its function is to reward our dignified actions, and its necessity is to fulfill the cause of which it serves.

24. Within this philosophy, there is a certain similarity of pattern of thought that we ascribe to its inducement.

25. We either subscribe to the theory that our thoughts become ideas that progress into beliefs, or we do not assimilate the concept of that reality.

26. Whether it can be construed, as a reasonable paradigm of philosophy, that I shall not contest with an axiomatic point.

27. What I shall asseverate is the assertion that dignity is applicable to our conductual actions and thoughts.

28. Honour is a reward that satisfies our ego, but dignity is the culmination of the satisfaction of value.

29. If we only please our ego, then we nullify the purpose of our plight and focus willingly.

30. To serve any cause is an example of dignity. To not serve any cause is to forsake the concepts of philosophy.

31. Each fundamental of ethos has an authentic cause and effect that systematises its subsistence.

32. What must be determined is the basis of that reason, within the synthesis of various ideas.

33. The concrete argument is not the concept of dignity, but the interpretation of its unique significance.

34. Once this has been effectuated, then it allows the observation of thought to proceed, beyond the syntomy of an explanation.

35. When this occurs, we reach the cognisance of the ultimate definition subjectively.

36. It is not an indubitable thought that dignity is a factor that humanity attempts to preserve naturally.

37. If we can make the surmisal that its contribution to ethos is not inconsequential, then we could realise the circumstance of that conclusion.

38. People often mistake what is categorically one thing from another, with their intemperance and misapprehension.

39. What that means is that we assume we have universal knowledge, when it is a mere supposition.

40. Dignity can be compared to that thorough analysis and approximation interpreted.

41. To sundry individuals it is nothing more than pretension or a false pretense exhibited.

42. However to others it is a grave matter of immense principle that does not approximate the truth at all.

43. If there was one thing that could explicate the meaning of dignity, it would be serving, for the greater cause of humanity.

44. After all it is humanity that we must serve, instead of our own selfish interests and satisdiction.

45. As a society and democracy in general, we must procure the total preservation of philosophy and the eradication of indigence.

46. There is no simplicity in philosophy that can be proven, as a mere difficulty and futility.

47. The simplest notions of philosophy are difficult to those that are ignorant of its capacity and contribution.

48. Subsequently, the complete understanding of this realisation is the result of awareness.

49. Dignity is the awareness of the mind's direct involvement, with the emergent process of ethos.

50. Every specific element of ethos that has been mentioned within the Oracle originates, from the concept of philosophy.

51. This form of philosophy is not linked to religion or science, but to the elementary fundamentals of philosophy.

52. As with logos, ethos is one of the original pillars of the ancient Greek democracy and philosophy.

53. We cannot be ignorant of the existence of philosophy and its ascertainable knowledge.

54. It is incumbent upon us to recognise the momentous implication that the instruction of philosophy offers as knowledge, and rids us of our amathia.

55. Dignity is the characteristic that all our scholars and mentors must always possess and instruct, with a comensurable effort.

56. If they did not, the entire process of ethos would be void of its logical premise and validity.

57. What we have not learnt in logos we must learn, with the application and knowledge of ethos.

58. The sapient nature of both has given us the comprehension of its formal structure and compliance.

59. The Oracle has attempted to expound on the concepts of logos and ethos, with the utmost efficacy.

60. Dignity is only one exemplary property that we associate to the theoretical state of our moral guidance.

61. Our reverence to any pertinent cause is genuinely, an exhibition of our superior dedication.

62. Dignity is an instrumental trait of our moral excellence displayed, and it subserves the need, for the development of our especial character.

63. It is an explicable part of an expressible component that wields influence, over our immoderate positions or actions.

64. It should not be exclusively attributed to the cause of our ego, but to the service of which we uphold and exemplify with conviction.

65. As human beings, we are taught since the age of our comprehensive awareness the worth of dignity.

66. Therein, it is predicated on the concurrence of the confirmed acknowledgement of its purpose.

67. At variance, its concept evokes the passion and fervour of our justification to be perceived, as meritorious.

68. However, the reality is merit is earned and not merely deserving or a supplementary form of altruism.

69. A noble deed is an actuality of a contemplative action dignified in composure and introspection.

70. Ergo, the relation, between merit and demerit is typically distinguished, in the perspective of the beholder.

71. Dignity signifies the concept of an attribute that elicits respect and typifies the simplification of its self-worth.

72. To be truly respected is the indisputable stage of the degree of value designated in concert, with the alternation of duty.

73. It is not measured, with the immeasurable acts of pompous vaniloquence or the superfluity of insipient insinuations.

74. Because, we are conscious for the most part, about the validity of our nobleness we seek diligence to understand the conception.

75. The immediate interest in the argument is expounded, in the concept asserted, within the amplification of knowledge.

76. We should not confound ourselves, with the similitude between honour and dignity, as it is applied to our comportment.

77. Unfortunately, honour is directly an attribute focused, on the fundamental of any pedigree prescribed, usually through merit and not deliberation.

78. On the contrary, dignity is the translucent demonstration of our civic qualities and mien revealed, along with our civil virtue.

79. We must be subjective and realise the clear distinction, between a deed and a merit that can be assumed to be a detriment, in association to our body, mind and soul.

80. Once this is recognised, then we are able to process the adequate knowledge retained in our mind, within the colligation subsumed.

81. The gift of knowledge and wisdom allows, for the mind to facilitate the concept of ethos and its praxic form.

82. The concept of dignity is personified, in the definite stage of our self-worth and acceptance.

83. It is an inherent value that we cherish and enlightens our cognisance and inspirational thoughts.

84. If we are aware of our characteristics, then morally it is equivalent to the composure reflected of its apposite nature.

85. When we express our dignity, we are mindful of our solemnity and its substantive value.

86. Hence, we are especially conscious of the perimeters of its contingency and attributable function.

87. How do we conceive the notion of dignity of the utmost regard? This is something that can be determined, with the cause that has been solicited.

88. Honour is basically an unaccountable recognition of value, whilst dignity is the basic quality of being revered.

89. Pride does not equate with dignity, since it refers to the state of approbation and specification.

90. A person can exhibit an act of dignity, even though that act is not reflected of tremendous pride.

91. All that it inhibits tacitly is the clarity of the lucid exposition of its variable and its proposition.

92. Humility and gratitude are common elements of dignity and arrogance and egotism are typically aligned with pride.

93. Respect and status are often utilised, when describing the conventional features of dignity.

94. It is seldom an occurrence that we fail to understand and learn, from our actual idiosyncrasy.

95. As curious individuals, we tend to view philosophy, as a meditative process of our conceptual thoughts and beliefs.

96. Within the profound state of our mind, we are emerged, in the constant dynamics of that belief that transcends any mere hypolemma established.

97. Ethos is devised and constructed, from its concept to guide our mind, body and soul suitably.

98. And what bestows us the familiar privilege of its recurrence is the idea that we benefit, from its praxis and development.

99. Philosophy is the main commonality of the precedence of our evolving considerations. It provides for us the actual basis of a belief that we can adhere to its established principles.

100. The next sequence that follows logos and ethos in the Oracle is titled pathos.

Rate this submission


You must be logged in to rate submissions

Loading Comments