Morality
(Ethikoitita)
1. The Oracle defines morality as the clear distinction of intentions, decisions, and actions between those considered just and those unjust, in accordance with one’s beliefs and conduct.
2. Men and women of paragon aretaic value and righteousness are not the sole proprietors of morality. Morality does not belong exclusively to those who judge and act according to a divine or human agent, but to those who judge and act justly.
3. “Excellence, then, is a state concerned with choice, lying in a mean, relative to us, this being determined by reason and in the way in which the man of practical wisdom would determine it,” declared Aristotle. We should not pursue excellence as perfection, but rather as the embodiment of reason.
4. Socrates said, “A system of morality which is based on relative emotional values is a mere illusion, a thoroughly vulgar conception which has nothing sound in it and nothing true.” Ergo, we must construe from his words that morality is unfounded if it lacks the conviction of reason and the application of ethics to support its essential principles.
5. Plato said, “Pursuing one's actual self-interest never conflicts with the demands of morality.” For him, it is more rational to pursue one’s real purpose than mere appearance or self-interest. Rationality and morality, thus, do not conflict; it is rational to be moral. From that asseveration we learn that to abandon reason is to forsake true morality.
6. Aristotle described moral virtue as a disposition to behave rightly, and as a mean between extremes of deficiency and excess, both of which are vices. We learn moral virtue primarily through habit and practice rather than mere instruction. This teaches us that our moral habits are shaped by our behaviour and actions.
7. The issue of morality is a contentious matter between religion and philosophy. Morality necessitates the presence of a moral agent, which is an individual with conscious awareness of their actions. To claim that only a god can serve as the ultimate authority in morality is to nullify humanity’s own capacity for moral judgement.
8. To propose that human beings are capable of being ethical and moral without religion and instead, through reason is more plausible than suggesting moral behaviour depends solely on a creator. Without consciousness, morality and its mores are rendered meaningless.
9. Why do some define morality strictly in religious terms, and presume that non-religious individuals lack morality? Is committing an injustice worse than suffering one to a rational atheist, agnostic, or theist?
10. Our inductive thoughts and decisions are shaped by the mental frameworks we are inculcated with norms rooted in our culture and education.
11. When we step beyond those frameworks and engage in meticulous observation and contemplation of the world, our morality begins to form around a belief system rooted in concepts, theories, and facts guided by reason, not blind faith.
12. A person must strive intuitively to understand self-knowledge, self-awareness, and self-being. The nature of our true self is linked to thought, volition, well-being (eudaimonia), and the physical dimension of the body.
13. Reducing suffering and enhancing well-being are moral acts, provided the individual understands the distinction between both. This knowledge does not necessitate religion.
14. Morality only requires cognition and consciousness. There are no absolute moral truths, as morality is subjective. The universe is indifferent to our suffering, and without our awareness, there is no moral agent to define morality.
15. We are not born with perfect moral purity. People may believe we are born innocent, but we are not, since true moral discernment must be developed, not presumed from birth.
16. It is more pertinent to discuss the tension between moral objectivity and subjectivity. In philosophy, moral objectivity refers to a fixed point of reference, while moral absolutism asserts that all actions are inherently right or wrong.
17. It would be unwise not to address the misconception of morality and the distinction between virtue and vice within that assertion. We must comprehend the value of virtue perceived in various ways depending on one’s beliefs.
18. Virtue is the embodiment of moral excellence, and vice the product of moral fault. Both derive from our actions. Morality acts as a guiding principle that may be seen as either objective or subjective, within the intricate dichotomy of human nature and rational thought.
19. If morality were purely religious, then I would need to clarify whether our actions stem from innate depravity or divinely assigned morality classified as good or evil, without reason or awareness. Without reason, we collapse into continual oblivion.
20. To accept that view, I must distinguish between our agathokakological traits, our conduct, disposition, and the effects of moral anomie. To reject this would be to deny the nature of the proposition itself.
21. The five core beliefs in philosophy are happiness, reason, nature, progress, and liberty. Without them, our ability to think, perceive, understand, and live meaningfully would be diminished.
22. Supreme intelligence is not a prerequisite for understanding morality. Its foundation lies in the indisputable logic of rational consequence.
23. I would argue that absolute morality is not congruent with philosophy’s general tenets, because it is not dogma but conscience that governs ethical behaviour, not personal convictions, nor religions, nor anything akin.
24. As one who follows a philosophy built upon human reason, I see gods only as conceptual constructs, not physical realities. To claim gods are transparent in nature is to argue they are omnipresent and evident beyond the realm of faith.
25. Ultimately, I must conclude with my scepticism: certainty about anything, especially the existence of gods, is indubitably impossible, because no one can know such a truth with apodictic certainty.
26. Thus, I am left with either the concept of logical positivism—that only statements verifiable through direct observation or logic are meaningful or with philosophemes of metaphysical significance.
27. To be intuitively moral is to be conscious of the relativity inferred beyond transcendental certainty. Morality does not require a god, but an active, reasoning consciousness. We need not divine grace when we already possess the wisdom of philosophy.
28. Am I less moral because I do not worship a god, or is that god more immoral for rejecting me? What value lies in a creed that denies the knowledge we possess, if such a creed is not universally applicable?
29. Philosophy’s moral compass lies in logical consistency and ethical precedence, not in the dichotomy of sin and righteousness. Abstaining from sin does not make us morally infallible. Moral justice arises through self-discipline, action, and virtue.
30. The notion that we are judged as sinners or saints is but an effort to impose guilt as a means to suppress the will. Pudicity, in the Oracle’s philosophy, does not equate to moral value. The Oracle teaches that bodily purity is found in health and well-being, not in the rejection of sensuality or a belief in inherited sin.
31. In philosophy, we are taught that good and bad are natural characteristics of our dispositions. Subsequently, good or bad is not defined by our shame and guilt, but by our deeds, which represent our inner self knowingly.
32. It is time to realise the unique difference and function of moral judgement and moral decadence. Moral judgement is attributed to a decision or action, while moral decadence is accredited to a lack of conscious thought or indifference.
33. Nothing of morality is a product of religious sin or ignorance. Instead, it is an ethical value espoused through rational sense. Therefore, its function is not to deter us by condemnation, but to guide us through the continuity of a logical structure of ethics.
34. The Oracle embodies the elements of morality and inculcates them precisely, with the intention of edifying the mind to reach a certain enlightenment that brings us knowledge and wisdom.
35. What we search for in morality is the quest for the essence of good. This good defines our character or traits. With it, we are capable of ascribing to the general practice of morality.
36. Whether our answers to questions are peirastic or simply pysmatic, they assist us in the process of determining what we value and what we deem moral from immoral through our judgement.
37. To be moralistic or not in the religious sense is not a concept to be adhered to in philosophy. No individual should consider others immoral based on the false analogy of their beliefs. We could interpret morality based on our conviction or eusebiac nature.
38. What makes us moral or immoral is what we conceive as just and not perceive as unjust. When we act with moral judgement, we exemplify our character, but this alone does not make us morally superior.
39. Every man or woman who professes a singular belief, whether it be religious or philosophical, must find meaning in that belief, or else it is rendered meaningless and unfulfillable.
40. What one believes in demonstrates the true conviction espoused, but it does not signify that this belief is just in its nature. For a belief to be just, it must be just to all.
41. If we contemplate the idea of morality in a general sense, then what could be argued or posited is a foundation for belief. What we desire to know is not always what we need to do. Every action committed with thought allows us to then ponder the right from the wrong of that action. This is when morality is impartial rather than partial.
42. Without knowledge, there is no wisdom; and without morality, there is no immorality. With morality and immorality, one serves the purpose of a just cause, while the other denies that cause.
43. We often attempt to play the supreme being of a god with our moral sense of judgement, and what we commonly find is that no man or woman is wise enough to learn from the distinction between moral and immoral without bias.
44. We tend to sit on our palatial throne of judgement and deem what is immoral and moral, without realising that we ourselves are casting aspersions upon ourselves, through the display of our lack of reasoning.
45. This is further accentuated in the way we speak and conduct ourselves, with self-righteousness and pretension. Vanity will only disrobe and corrupt one's intentions and true identity. It is facile to be influenced by things that are adscititious rather than adventitious.
46. Every whole-minded person must be accountable for his or her actions in life. Everyone is capable of the common traits of good and bad. It is we, the people, who define their relevant signification.
47. The belief that our gender, race, nationality, religion, or status makes us morally superior to others is to confirm a complexity of inferiority from the outset.
48. Within the commonality of beliefs, there are countless things that people believe with absolute morality and conviction. However, the world does not revolve around the self-existence of any belief. It merely exists and nothing more. The world is the reflection of self-evidence discovered by self-awareness.
49. Decency is relative to modesty, and modesty is relative to conduct. Without either decency or modesty, our conduct is rendered ineffective and indifferent. Thus, morality determines our modesty and conduct.
50. The issue of morality is not a concept of religion. In essence, it is founded originally on the philosophical morality of ethics. Ethics is didactic and exponible in its praxis and teachings. Simply, it does not require the inclusion of religion, but rather the synteresis of sophrosyne.
51. The best reward one could receive is the acknowledgement of the humanity within someone's virtue. It is important that we learn to distinguish healthy ambition from avid ambition.
52. Absolute morality is incomparable to the beliefs of philosophy, because what guides our behaviour is the fundamental essence of our conscience, not our personal convictions or religions. A belief is not the same as faith: faith is mere inspired devotion, while belief is a conscious thought embedded in our mind.
53. Propriety is a natural trait that could be considered a form of consuetude, because our actions are dependent on our behaviour and habits. Character is not based solely on integrity, but also on the evident accountability of judgement and action. "Men are disturbed not by things, but by the principles and notions which they form concerning things," declared Epictetus.
54. The word reputation is such a whimsical notion to attribute to someone. To describe a person's identity, it is better defined as human character. It is human character that helps build our morality.
55. I cannot acknowledge any ethical or moral principle for capitalism. Is there any rational person who could justify quantified profit or greed in an ethical or moral sense? A person cannot rationalise that argument with a rebuttal, because the rebuttal would be irrational from the premise.
56. I have never understood the purpose of immoral condemnation, because the majority who accuse are unjust zealots more immoral than the accused. I am convinced there is more about us that unites us than divides us in our empathy and beliefs.
57. Do not presume to know everything, when it is better to assume that knowledge is only that which is presently known. Thus, it is knowledge that assists one in the understanding of just morality.
58. The common characteristics I attribute to philosophy are intertwined with the discernible traits reflected in quotidian human behaviour, associated with ethics and utilitarianism.
59. Our deeds are determined by the awareness of our actions, predisposed to the preconception of our erroneous conduct that causes our wrongdoings and indiscretions in the first place. The religious concept of sin is dismissed in the Oracle. It is a non sequitur, since philosophy addresses the moral issue of self-control, not sinful discretions.
60. The moral compass in philosophy is predetermined in the consistency of logic and ethics, which take precedence over the instructed belief of sin and righteousness that predominate in religion.
61. No concept or belief can be fully understood as moral or immoral, even with abderitism, if there is not a logical premise to base a foundation of thought upon that provides rationality to complex questions about human mores and is didactic. Conscience is knowing right from wrong, but consciousness is being aware of the distinction.
62. Conscience is a powerful mechanism that enhances our ethos tremendously. It also makes us mindful of the situations and ordeals we must confront, despite their unpredictability.
63. It recompenses the incidence of the errors and foibles we admit as our defects. It projects the lucid understanding of what is right from wrong, what is logical or illogical in our actions and thoughts, whether by premeditation or afterthought.
64. The purpose of morality is to serve our better judgement and telic conceptions wisely, not the blatant misconceptions of what we ascribe to moral or immoral arguments, whether deduced or adduced.
65. If we cannot intrinsically deem a thing or a person immoral or moral, then it is best to refrain from judgement and seek wisdom by ascertaining more knowledge that can be discovered.
66. What makes us moral agents is our capacity to comprehend the distinction between what is just and unjust, humane and inhumane. This is personified by the element of prohairesis.
67. We cannot function as moral agents if we are deprived of any semblance of rational thinking. This burden becomes a problem to nomological concepts of morality that lead to a clear misunderstanding.
68. There is such a thing as immorality, but it is not a question of condemning false morality, rather the absence of reason and logic. Without reason and logic, the quiddity of morality is devoid of any true substance and affirmation of the truth.
69. We could attempt to expound with synomilies or homilies what morality represents, and align them with nomothetic verities, expecting them to be congruent and compatible, but morality is not meant to be fidimplicitary.
70. The Oracle provides us with a philosophy that embraces the concept of morality, with logos and ethos. It cannot be less or more than that which guides us in our path toward moral clarity and prudence.
71. When we seek morality outside of the philosophic realm, we tend to believe we are sophronised by a higher authority that is a god. Yet optimality is neither effectuated, nor is the enlightenment of the seity possessed.
72. It only deviates our chosen path in life. When, as humans, we depend less on deities for guidance in morality and more on our own will and capacity, we then find ourselves capable of reaching a just morality.
73. This is where we discover such things within our endoxas and physis as the synesis, the synderesis, and the syneidesis. One deals with the faculty of good judgement, another with moral action, and the last with the capacity for moral judgement. These enhance our wise learning.
74. There are adiaphorons, where an individual attempts to be neutral, but neutrality in morality is only a compromise, not a definite answer. Thus, it is better not to judge something of which one is not convinced of its totality and implication.
75. To be moral is not the same as to be righteous, just as to be immoral is not the same as to be depraved. In the teachings of the Oracle, the difference is understood in the relevance and meaning of what it is to be moral or immoral. There is a difference between being altitudinarian and latitudinarian. We must apply equilibrium, not casuistry.
76. The Oracle ascribes to the thought that there is a purity within our consciousness, which guides or misleads us. This is how we determine what or who is moral from immoral. We choose to be moral or immoral, willingly or unwillingly, through our actions and judgements.
77. The inner self that defines our character or persona is only the mechanism to our cognisance. When we apply cognition and sentience to things that are existential in our world, then we ascertain the realisation of those actions and judgements.
78. Everything we deem moral has an opposite that contradicts that morality. Ergo, there is a certain truth in that statement. The conundrum is not what is determined to be moral, but why it is determined to be immoral? On what foundation is this immorality based, if it does not pertain to the purity of the truth?
79. If we deem that the self or soul is impure with immorality, then we must also deem that the body is immoral. If both are impure in thought and action, then we must accept and concede that our rationality is impure.
80. As conscious agents of morality, we subscribe to the practice of virtues and respect. We must accede to the view that we grow wiser with knowledge and come to understand more deeply the conceptualisation of morality.
81. People may believe in numerous things that are presumed to be either immoral or moral in nature. They may believe in justice or injustice. What allows us to see the veracity of something is not the guise of immorality, but rather the truth of that morality.
82. We are inclined to believe in things that imbue our convictions or define our faith. Faith is a blind man’s conviction. It is not the moral compass of morality. It is merely the precursor to the errant nature of an ulterior ego.
83. The greatest achievement of morality is to be sapient and devout to the cause it serves and the purpose it demonstrates. If we allow zealots to impose their morality, then we permit morality to become flawed and unjust in its judgement.
84. To know our imperfections and flaws is to be morally just and not compromised. It is when we are truly mindful of these things that we are deeply immersed in our consciousness and reality.
85. We have the ability to refine our vision of morality through wisdom and knowledge. It is vital to our development that we heed the ampliative teachings of philosophy. Once we have attained understanding, we culminate the process of philosophical fulfilment.
86. To acknowledge rectitude based on, or inferred from, righteousness is only a presumption of truth. It does not signify that it is the truth. By assuming it is, one is neglecting the truth.
87. I can choose to be moral or immoral. We are not born with either trait, but I possess a mind that distinguishes between the two. When we decide to act on either, we are confronted by the inevitable consequence of that choice.
88. How we treat others largely depends on how others treat us. How we judge others depends on how we are judged. From the teachings of philosophy, we learn not to depend on others, but to depend on ourselves.
89. To conceal what we think and feel is to assume that we are less moral. To express what we think and feel is to presume we are more moral. Life does not make people indistinct, people do.
90. The Oracle bestows upon us knowledge we did not possess, and wisdom we could not utilise. It is not merely the perception of morality to which we must be attentive; rather, we must heed the mind and its emerging consciousness.
91. When we discover our goodness, we are able to confront our evil. To claim that we have no evil within us is to foolishly discard our mortal humanity.
92. A person can choose to be good or evil, or can believe that good and evil are tangible reflections of the self. The manifold things we do in life are, consequently, reflections of our good or bad character and actions.
93. Evil and good are embodied in our deeds and actions. Philosophy teaches us that we are not born good or evil; rather, we instinctively or intuitively learn to become good or evil.
94. This does not preclude us from becoming good after being evil, or evil after being good. It simply denotes the feasibility of such transformation within our idiosyncrasy and mind.
95. A human being can be taught to be good or evil in life; yet it is the immediate action of that individual which ultimately determines the sequential consequence of the act undertaken.
96. There are times when we believe we are doing good for the benefit of others, even while knowingly and willingly committing a wrong act, and justifying it with an ostensibly good intention.
97. Morality is not meant to be entirely complex. It is we humans who make it seem more complex in nature and essence. This is influenced by our uncertainties. Our intellectual exploration has no true limits, except those imposed by our minds and our lack of acceptance of its moral nature.
98. What we learn in life must be applied equally to morality. If we have not learnt life’s difficult lessons, how can we expect to learn morality’s inspirational ones?
99. The question seldom answered yet often asked is: what purpose does our morality serve when it is overtly restricted or limited in its expression? “Moral excellence comes about as a result of habit. We become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by doing brave acts,” said Aristotle.
100. Can we express our morality without the liberty of uninhibited volition? Thus, what use is the concept of morality if we do not possess the capacity for free will?
Free Will
(Eleytheri Boylisi)
1. The Oracle defines free will as a concept of this philosophy that is the notional capacity or ability to choose accordingly between different possible courses of action, unimpeded and uninterrupted.
2. It is intended for the purpose of self-expression and self-reliance. It does not equate with the notion of destiny or the divinity of a god per se. It merely encompasses all that is rational and volitional. Epictetus said, "We cannot choose our external circumstances, but we can always choose how we respond to them."
3. Socrates believed that free will and self-control are one and the same, combined in commitment, and the concept that reason, properly cultivated, can and ought to be the all-controlling factor in human life.
4. According to Aristotle, free will and moral responsibility are determined by our endowed character. This would be exemplified afterwards by our ability to be rational and conscious.
5. I believe that the compulsive nature of human behaviour is related to certain degrees of emotional instability and irrational thinking that arise unnaturally. Freedom of expression is the path to liberty and free will. Epictetus believed that no man is free who is not master of himself.
6. Free will is conditioned by a sequence of order or actions that are, at best, probable or contingent. We might appear to have the determination that constitutes our will, but it cannot be equally measured or considered libertarian in the philosophical sense when it is predicated on the principles of variables, particulars, universals, and constants. Ergo, it needs to be verified through volitional actions.
7. Thus, the notion of free will is determined by an action that is proven correlatively to the exponible action and manifestation of an expressible want. In the end, whether free will, determinism, and compatibilism are compossible is a matter more of endeitic states of probability.
8. We must always use the criterion of relativity to make any logical arguments plausible in the commonality of universal sense. Otherwise, they result in illogical deductions that render them irrelevant.
9. The most common form of deception displayed is the most apparent form of dishonesty conceived historically, in dogmatic platitudes and undesirable extremes that are nothing more than futile.
10. There is the perception that destiny is a material course that could easily be altered by us, but that would not be entirely conclusive. We might presume that there is an actual destiny that is finite in the nature of its composition, and it is not improbable to assume that we are participants in some form of deterministic universe. Even so, it does not preclude that we are without free will.
11. Human stupidity is not the same as human ignorance. Stupidity in humans is the presumption of knowledge, whilst ignorance is the lack of knowledge. Within that cogitation lies the apparent truth of the misleading perception of the human will.
12. To acknowledge that fate is fundamentally predetermined or determined. and that it thus negates any notion of free will is bold in its assumption. But it would imply that my choice is predicated on a contingency or action predetermined, thereby disenabling my free will.
13. This does not mean that some kind of divine agent controls our destiny without our volitional involvement or interaction. If we inferred such a deterministic belief, it would imply that the actions of human beings are deterministic, even though they may appear consciously sufficient and adaptable in deciding rationally.
14. From such a deduction, our power and resolution would be considered fruitless and inconsequential, as these attributes are linked to contingent factors. Nevertheless, there are probabilities that may be more aligned with the causal effects of some manifestation of free will.
15. I believe that all people have the capacity for original thoughts and ideas within their minds. What people do with these thoughts and ideas after realising that capacity determines how they make decisions and establish their ideologies. The problem is not the mere essence of those thoughts, but the meaning they convey that defines that ideology.
16. When I address the subject of choice, I am explicating the misconceptions around its usage. In order to express choice as a selection, we must first understand the distinction and emphasis of its actual meaning and significance.
17. I might believe, in my asserted assumption, that I have a definite choice in my selection, but let me explain the selective process of that possibility. First, there must be a contingency for a need, followed by a specific reason for that selection.
18. If I infer that I do not have free will in selecting, then I am reducing my option or alternative to a lesser choice, not one made with the faculty of rational thinking. The simplicity of my argument is that the mind must be in unison with the will.
19. To fully understand the universal meaning of choice, people must comprehend the natural process. Choice without the contingent factors of need and reason is absent of purpose, and purpose without choice is absent of logic.
20. The essence of the heimarmene, or so-called fate in philosophy, is not intended to be understood as a forcible imposition of time or a divine agent upon the notion of a plausible libertarian will or eleuthery. In my opinion, the heimarmene is to be acknowledged as the realisation of our actions, which are independent of any divine fate but existential in truth and nature.
21. Fate and luck, in analogies outside the philosophical sense, are essentially irrelevant, because time is interminable, and luck is nothing more than the perception of something.
22. A man may advocate any principle of philosophy and its justification for his desires, but without the throne of absolute power, that man is merely a visionary aspirant with no will to proceed in his aspiration.
23. It is necessary to explicate that free will is a choice to exercise, not a power to exploit. Ignoring that distinction would suggest that power is solely the driving force behind free will. One must not confuse power with determination and volition to succeed.
24. Without free will, we would be subject to a blind fate or destiny of which we know nothing and over which we would have no control. This would imply that we are merely participants in life, not owners of our thoughts and rationality.
25. The Oracle advocates free will within a framework of cause and effect. It is vital that we comprehend that if we are not allowed to be free thinkers capable of making our own selections and decisions, then we become marginalised and banausic, irrelevant as a species. God or gods do not, nor should they, determine our lives.
26. Our mortality is not simply a question of death; it is defined by life, and how we live that life in accordance with our decisions and actions. We can alter its course, or it can be altered by circumstance. Free will allows us to live and think.
27. When we address the issue of free will, we are also addressing the issue of free thinking. Both of these elements are intrinsically linked in their viability. It is not a matter of solipsism or egoism when we adhere to the concept of pronoia. What is meant by pronoia is foresight, not divine providence.
28. We learn by rote or ordalium, things we process in thought and express in opinion. By inhibiting this natural process, we inhibit both mind and expression.
29. This would only impede our deliberation and progress. It would make us focus more on our flaws than on the inclusion of our animus and nous. A sophos who is pansophic is a man who does not require divine immanence. The philosophical immanence he attains is internal to his ipseity and rewarding to his gnosis.
30. He does not need to be a god to obtain the sagacity his mind provides. He may err in his path, but he ultimately reaches his destination when he can use that sagacity freely.
31. We may contend the issue of free will with either the inclusion or exclusion of a god, but it must be elaborated that the philosophy expressed in the Oracle concerns the human will, not some preternatural will imposed by a deity.
32. It must be noted that all things determined or not have a concatenation with contingency. Whether we dismiss that eventuality is irrelevant to the issue. Whatever action or decision is exerted is based on the contingent factor of something already established.
33. What would life be if we were hostages to fate? If life were already determined and we could not alter the course of its destiny, then what good or purpose would it serve to function in a world that was predetermined from its origin?
34. We, as humans, possess the inherent will to change the course of our lives. We can define ourselves and strive against the notion of our alterity. We might be philodoxical or choose to be lucid with our minds, reasoning intuitively through contemplation about the things we attempt to comprehend more effectively.
35. Our will progresses in life when we learn to utilise it and when we enable our foundation to proceed with its actions. It is not a will of imposition, but a will that provides us with the basis for our rational coherence.
36. If we do not possess ratiocination lucidly, then our mind is nullified and restricted to the instability of our emotions and repetitive instinct, which are neither reliable nor productive.
37. Free will is not a reward that we gain, but a right that we have earned. Nothing is guaranteed with free will, yet everything that we do with it gives us the ability to learn and become sagacious, once we are permitted to express our minds.
38. To relinquish one's will to determinism is to relinquish one's self. It would render that identity feckless and irrelevant. It is veracious that the universe does not depend on us for its existence, but one must be conscious of the fact that we are part of the universe. Things that occur in the universe naturally, or through a phenomenon, do not occur through thought or the action of a mind.
39. We govern our minds when rational, as we forsake them when irrational. Knowing that we have activated minds and can use them wisely, we must always seek to express our thoughts. Free will is not a dormant nullibiety.
40. If a god determines our fate, then what is the point in living a life that is predestined from its origin? If we are born into a society that is predestined for us, or a life that is planned for us by others, then what logic would life signify, if it were not allowed to evolve freely? When things of this nature occur, it is the oppression of free will, not the concept of free will itself, that should be debated.
41. Thus, it is reason that enables us to reflect on the difference between a choice and a necessity; between self-identity and compatibility; between determination and complacency.
42. It is more facile to be complacent in this world than to be determined. Free will does not replace complacency with determination; it merely activates our consciousness and our capacity for rumination.
43. It may appear, in the model of the universe, that all is determined through the cause of reality. But when we speak of human beings and determinism, we cannot exclude the notion of free will. What I describe as free will is comparative to the human mind, not the universe.
44. It must be explained that what is determined is not the same as what is contingent. For example, a person could express their agency and free will, despite the fact that there are things they cannot control. Those are determined, but there are things we can control that are contingent on our actions and decisions.
45. When we observe the things perceived in our minds, we are able to conceive thoughts, and this is the mechanism of free will. When we are reluctant to achieve our goals, it is because we are determined to believe that we have no true course of action that is not dependent on others. Our faculty of free will is predisposed to our actions and decisions.
46. The difference between voluntary and involuntary will is the belief and thought that we can either change the course of something or that it is impossible to change it intentionally.
47. With free will, we must accept that things are not the consequence of a determination, but of contingency. With free will comes responsibility. Each human being is responsible for their actions and decisions. We cannot simply eschew that responsibility with obstinacy.
48. When we exercise free will volitionally, we become consciously aware of the things that are important and those that are not. We learn to value the necessary over the unnecessary.
49. The faculty of judgement validates our free will. It permits us to focus on what is relevant to us and on what we can control. It is important that we denote that reality.
50. Free will does not empower our status in and of itself; it only grants us the emergent power to change our status in life, either by achieving a goal or by remaining in the same status quo.
51. It may be an axiopisty we depend upon, or a prolepsis that provides us with an instrumentality that, as human beings, we can process and assess for validity. Free will is not the answer to selfhood, nor the entropy of determinism. Rather, it is the utility of the mind.
52. “Men are swayed more by fear than by reverence,” said Aristotle. It is known that we fear what we cannot explain. It is easier to present falsifiability than to acknowledge comprehensibility. It is easier to portray uncertainty than to demonstrate confidence. Those who are confident are those who strive further; those who fear are those who remain irrelevant.
53. “How can you call a man free when his pleasures rule over him?” Socrates declared. There are those who are hedonists or Epicureans. For them, life is all about the pursuit of pleasure, and for them, free will is not a matter of choice, but of preference.
54. Perhaps we shall never agree on whether free will is a plausibility or an implausibility. Philosophy is a unique discipline that imparts free thinking and consciousness.
55. To assume that we, as human beings, are incapable of choice is to assume that we are without reason. To assume we are destined in life is to assume that we have no course but the one provided, and only that course as our option.
56. Free will does not make us wiser than others; it merely makes us conscious. Whether we decide to realise this depends on our intuitive sense of understanding—of how life evolves, and how we evolve.
57. We can choose to be represented by our free will or claim that it is only destiny which determines our life, not our will. That would imply that we live for our destiny, rather than to create one not conditioned by limitations.
58. Once more, it is contingency that conduces our lives and actions. However, we are still capable of some form of free expression and of willingly changing the course of our lives.
59. If we submitted our will to the notion of a planned destiny that deprived us of the natural process of thought, logic, and rationality, we would be forced to accept our lives as meaningless.
60. Nothing in life is meant to be easily understood or defined as absolute, except life and death. Everything else is contingent and follows a sequential order that explains its evolution. There are innumerable things that are variable or invariable in essence, but they are mostly material, not the intricacies of the mind, which are thoughts.
61. It is the mind and its inveteracy that persists in its quest for insoluble enigmas, such as the question of free will and other philosophical concerns. The mind is a powerful mechanism and so is our will.
62. To dismiss the capacity of the mind is to dismiss the capacity for thought and reason. What differentiates volition from nolition is the impact of determination. Determination allows a person to broaden their internal conviction and integral knowledge.
63. Aspiring to something is far more convincing and tangible in essence when there is great inspiration and free will to enable the mind to achieve that aspiration.
64. When that aspiration becomes a goal or a purpose, it is free will that shapes our ideas and thoughts and transforms them into coherent objectives. These objectives, in turn, manifest as our deeds or actions.
65. The assertion of fate should not limit our conception and expressive exercise of free will. On the contrary, it should strengthen our reasoning a fortiori.
66. By strengthening the mind, we are imbued with phronesis, which dictates our capacity to learn about things that are exponible and lucid in our world. A strong mind supports a strong will.
67. There are distinctive concepts that are noumenal and conglomerative in nature. Free will is one of those concepts which, when aligned with conviction, rationality, and logic, provides us with a firm basis for a transpicuous vision.
68. What we perceive from that vision is what we ultimately conceive as relevant and substantial. A person deprived of free will is not only oppressed, but unable also to express themselves, whether willingly or unwillingly.
69. When we recall quondam experiences, we are relating to the rapid sequence of time and events. Thus, we apply knowledge and thought to the things we have learnt and acquired.
70. It must be stated that, as human beings, we are constantly evolving in our minds, learning new things that form the omphalos of our knowledge and wisdom, which we apply daily.
71. To be practical is not erroneous. It is only when our practicality supersedes our free thinking that our judgement becomes erroneous. To be logical is to be simply conscious in one’s mind.
72. Our ability to rationalise, and the application of thought, affects our idiosyncrasy and mental faculties. With rationality, our free will is not inhibited; but without it, we can only attempt to rationalise what we seek to rationalise. In other words, what our will wishes is limited only by the means of its expression. It cannot solve the enigma of what significance that will truly holds.
73. Free will can represent many things that a person believes to be expressive and volitional. It is the noesis that enables our free will in the first place to be measured, with a tremendous value that we equate to individuality.
74. There is a truth in the use of free will. It is one that we seek and attempt to understand. The will is as strong as the mind. If we do not learn this lesson from the beginning, then what purpose will this lesson serve?
75. To exercise free will is not about displaying one’s self-indulgence or ego. It is about the presence or renewal of the self, which is the one thing that defines who we are and how we wish to be identified.
76. “Freedom is the greatest fruit of self-sufficiency,” said Epicurus. This we can apply to the notion of free will. If we cannot satisfy ourselves, then how do we expect others to do so, without expecting something in return?
77. Once we have accepted the things we cannot control, we begin to rationalise the things that we can. As Epicurus stated, some things happen of necessity, others by chance, others through our own agency.
78. To what extent can we humans be autonomous with our free will? To the extent that we can control things as moral agents. As agents, we are capable of distinguishing between things that are necessary and those that occur by contingency. It is difficult to conceive that things transpire merely by chance or serendipity. They are either the result of some contingent phenomenon or simply the consequence of our actions and decisions.
79. We could argue for a determined fate and posit that a god or universal forces dictate the course of our lives from birth, or argue that life can be altered by our free will. It is true that death appears to be a predestined eventuality, but it neither precludes nor concludes when it will take place. Ipso facto, it is better to assume that our free will is best used on those things we can control.
80. When discussing free will, the concepts of libertarianism, determinism, compatibilism, and incompatibilism are introduced. There is no singular vision of what free will represents in its totality, nor are there absolute views of its negation in plurality, either to include or exclude the possibility of free will.
81. We could postulate that free will is non-existent and challenge that plausibility, but that would imply that free will holds no initial potentiality of thought, thus eliminating the mechanism of our thought process, which is aligned with the mind.
82. Free will is not an invariable system that provides us with all the answers; it is a coherent expression of our volition. To presume that it is, is to commit a fallacy in conclusion.
83. As human beings, we possess ethosed qualities that make us sentient, percipient, and sapient. Scilicet, it is these qualities that enable the enhancement of our consciousness. In return, they help us understand the fundamental elements of life in the broader sense.
84. When we experience akrasia, we undergo a burden that inhibits our noesis and our empirical knowledge. Eventually, it will reflect upon our sophrosyne. In the dynamics of our free will, a sound mind is always required in order to think rationally and attain aponia.
85. Without deliberation, our references to free will become more illogical and less grounded. Our stable disposition is vital to our free will and eleutherian pursuit. It reveals our rationality or irrationality through our conduct.
86. To be endowed with free will is to be empowered with an autexousious human nature, not a homoousious one. When we comprehend the limitations of our mortality and its capacity, then matters of relevance become far more meaningful in their purpose.
87. The implex nature of free will may never be deciphered, and we shall continue to engage with concepts and arguments for or against it. Some people state that free will is a sign of irrationality, while others claim it is the expression of rationality. That, in itself, is not a contradiction.
88. Whether or not free will is arbitrary or not depends on our viewpoint and perception. We could reject the premise of free will or embrace its established foundation. Either stance does not render the comprehension of free will as schematic.
89. The viability of free will compared to the notion of predestined fate is far more intricate than its initial assumption. Fate is more conducive to faith than to logic and reason. Fate is an incompossibility to the activated mind. Faith is something that conditions our free will. It inhibits our thoughts and our ability to intellectually dispute dogmas.
90. Once more, to assume that everything in our lives is predestined is to accept an inconsistency and the invariable nature of human actions or decisions. We cannot remain captives to the idea that we are incapable of evolving as human beings.
91. I do not assert that free will is the only recourse for self-expression. I merely claim that without it, we are devoid of a significant part of the nucleus of our selfhood.
92. The Oracle does not presume to be the authority over one’s mind or ethos. It cannot project beyond the scope of one’s intentions or necessities. Its sole purpose is the attainment of enlightenment.
93. Our behaviour is incumbent on our decisions and actions, but free will does not intrude upon these with necessity. Instead, it is a vehicle of our mind to express openly and volitionally our thoughts and desires in harmony with reason.
94. Things that are unnamed or undefined should not be presumed to represent a predetermined fate, a zemblanity, or epochality. We should not fill our minds with such senseless thoughts.
95. Free will is composed of the intrinsic elements of thought and reason. It may be proposed as the precursor to ratiocination. What it is not in its totality is the conclusion of reason.
96. In philosophy, we are taught that nothing is prescribed as certain until we have explored its uncertainties. Nothing remains invariable until we have fully discovered the variables.
97. Free will to some is possible, to others impossible. It can be explained in many ways and understood through various concepts and ideas, but its origin is profoundly embedded in the human psyche.
98. To acknowledge that we possess free will is to assume that we are the rightful owners of our own lives. It does not make us superior to others, nor does it make us wiser. It simply makes us more conscious.
99. It is the conscious realm that guides us through life. Without consciousness, free will is inoperable, and its utility would then be considered futile. Plato declared that we only exercise free will by consciously choosing to be good, rather than naturally succumbing to evil.
100. This is why it is necessary to achieve a clear understanding of free will that will enable us to seek the fruition of our lives. Without life, there is no free will to fulfil its purpose. The ultimate goal of life should be to live virtuously, fulfilling one's potentiality and free will should be used to attain that goal. Our will is a part of our life.