Within the contents of the prolegomenous introduction of the soul I present as an intercourse, I shall discuss the philosophical concepts and aspects of the extraordinary soul that are a vivid constatation of the numerous states of the soul that are perhaps more construed, as theoretical in their pure essence and exhibition. What I shall attempt to elaborate in my discourse is a mere representation of the expansive hegemonikon of philosophy and its communicable value and katalepsis. Thus, I shall begin with what the word 'soul' actually meant to the knowledgeable sages of Ancient Greece and what would have been the dianoetic conclusion of the experimental idea and intricacy of the immortal soul, in accordance to the existence and compatibility of a theist demiurgos or Universal Creator inferred.
When we address the intellectual subject of the soul, we must first accentuate the diaphoretic and congruent theories of the ancient Greeks expatiated comparatively. We are informed of this comparison with the epimartyresis of the distinct Presocratic thinkers and the philosophical theories that are our primary reference, for any plausible argument predicated on the establishment of the immortal soul. We know of the intrinsic thoughts and explainable doxas of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus, and the Stoics, on the specific matter and concept of the immortal soul's composition and existence, because of the metron of their pronounced theories and the poiens of the dedicated followers.
Socrates believed in a philosophical concept of the one or the good, which could be then interpreted as the Demiurgos or a Universal Creator that was not to be idolised or worshipped, but to function, as a normative and teleological purpose for his absolute existence. The establishment of logical order was necessary and paramount to understand the actual capacity of the mind, intellect, and intelligence, within its form and consequent effects. The nous required an animated soul and the psyche had to be then embodied, in order to exist within the ample sphere of the living beings it was associated to its conversion. Thus, we can only suspect with the conventional thought that living beings such as ourselves, have only at our gradual disposal an approximate knowledge of the explicit validity of matter that can function in a metaphysical manner, where the nous can function without the immediate interaction of matter. The soul was believed to be the incorporeal or spiritual "breath" that animated the process of life and its continuation. Socrates explicitly appealed to the considerable notion that it is the soul that animates the body and consciousness of a living thing or being, with its modification. The magnitude of that thought can be perceived and realised, as a variable of an unparalleled contingency.
Socrates had offered four fundamental arguments in his exposition for the soul's immortality: The Cyclical Argument or Opposites Argument, that explicated that forms are eviternal and as the soul always emanates life, then it must not cease in its prolongation and is imperishable than immaterial. In the Cosmogonical argument of the soul, there are three basic variants of the argument, each with subtle yet important differentiations: the arguments from in causa (causality), in esse (essentiality), and in fieri (becoming). They are all aligned to the multiple elements of causation, change, motion, contingency, or finitude in respect of the universe, as a whole or the process within its congruence and semblance. The soul of Socrates could be then interpreted to reflect the transcendence of the possibilities and extension of the soul.
As for the concept of the Platonic soul, it consisted of three main parts, the logos, (mind, nous, or reason) the thymos, (emotion, spiritedness, or masculine) the eros (appetitive, desire, or feminine). Plato thought that the soul could exist separately from the vehicle of the body, but Aristotle disagreed with that firm assumption. Aristotle believed that only one part of the soul was immortal in particular the intellect (logos), and therefore, it would require the presence of a primal vehicle or hypodochemene to function properly. The soul of Plato is affirmative in the physical nature of its transpicuous matter. I tend to rationalise Aristotle' concept of the soul, lesser than the concepts of Socrates and Plato. The contrast between the three philosophers is emphasised, in the discrepancy of the interpretation of the soul. Aristotle stated that the soul neither existed without a body nor is a body of some constitution. For it is not a body, but it belongs to a body, and for this particular reason is present in a body, and in a body of some existing composition. Yet, what is not fully understood is the interpretation of what is veraciously meant by the soul is not a body and that it depends on the one and its unique dimension. I am under the impression that the key is defining the property of the soul, as the intelligible plane of the universal hypodochemene that is extant and indefinite in, its essence as pure energy. For Aristotle, the soul was the primal foundation of the form and matter of a natural being, which adhibited it to reach its total actuality. This structure between form and matter is elemental and necessary for any kind of activity or functionality, to be possible in a natural being. Aristotle asserted, "What is it that, when present in a body, makes it living?-A soul."
The fascinating concatenation between the soul and body, according to Aristotle, was also an example of the general concatenation between form and matter with its synaition. Thus an ensouled, living body is a singular kind of matter. If we began to apply simplicity to the relative things by limiting ourselves to the observation of the sublunary world as eonta within the intelligible, then its symbebekos permits us to conceive afterwards, the ensoulment of the synechy of our hypodochemene and its entelechy, as an instrument of alethic existence and not an anomaly. This would allow the observer the acute perception and phrontis of the correlation, between the terrestrial world and the universal hypodochemene.
In regard to the afterlife, Aristotle's belief on the subject was not postulated in the interpretative form of any individualistic term of which, we associate to the orismos of religion. He believed in the principle of the one and the active intellect of a universal poioun or demiurge that is evidently attributed to the mechanism of our quotidian functions. Even though it is presumed that our lives abate, when these functions abate at the ominous stage of death the only thing that is truly confirmed as absolute evidence is the affirmation of our mortal expiry. Hence, the origin of that finality is recognised, in the systematicity of its logical conclusion. Death is the final process of our physicality, and the soul is the dominant energy that is the akatalepton of science. There is no peritrope of the process and the only thing that remains is the phroniman.
If we debated the concept of heaven and hell of religion anent Ancient Greece, we would surmise that Christianity in particular is similar to the Greek concepts of Elysium and Hades. What difference is there between the rituals of prayers, hymns and worship of religion and paganism in this aspect? The concept of limbo or purgatory was conceived by the Ancient Greeks consistently, before the advent of Christianity. And the concept of the afterlife and afterworld had a conceptualised precedence that was firmly established in Greek Society. The Ancient Greeks accepted the existence of the soul after death; although there was no real consensus on the extent of the topic and there was an eclectic divergence of opinion and hypothesis. The conceptualisation of the afterlife should be acknowledged, as a philosophic presumption than a mere unfounded conjecture that must be substantiated by science, since there is a first principle introduced.
Aristotle had considered the incorporeal soul to be the sempiternal occupancy of our being that was reflected in our evolving intellect. He stated that the soul was the supreme actuality of a body that had the subsistence of a genuine life in its transparency. If we regard life to mean the visible capacity for self-substance as a composite of matter and form, then the soul is the actual form of a natural body that exists. Aristotle defined the soul as the first actuality of a natural body that has life and potentiality. He stated also that the soul assists human beings to find the truth, but to ultimately understand the actual purpose or role of the soul was controvertible and controversial, because of its convoluted nature and premise.
When we attempt to explicate the purpose of the soul in philosophy, we either utilise metaphysics or noesis to the plethos of our thoughts or concepts that are attributed to our arguments or criterions. We can dispute the vague interpretation of any form of philosophy in our Pyrrhonism, but if the ascribable presumption is based on a reasonable contingency of principles, then the a fortiori argument should not be entirely dismissed as implausible. Thus, within the heterogeneity of provisory notions, there is a point of the convergence of our thoughts with the hyparxis of the soul that can be validated, with our conspection and the epideictic interpretation of the hypolepsis of the soul.
Once we have established the existing premise of the function of the soul and its purpose, we then can elucidate on the verification and intrinsicality of the immortality of the soul, within an exponible deduction. To assert that there is a noumenal effect equated to the soul is not a mere paralogism or a dilogical proposition, when we examine the full perception of the human mind and its boundaries. The field of science associates the brain to our consciousness, yet there is a definite distinction, between the meaning of the brain and the mind, in the comprehension of philosophy. The brain is the central part of the visible, tangible world of the body, whilst the mind is the central part of the invisible, transcendent world of thought, feeling, attitude, belief and clear imagination that manifest in our body and soul. The brain is the physical organ most associated with the mind and consciousness, but the mind is not confined to the perimeters or limitation of the brain. Therefore, the mind can be immortal in its existential matter and form, if that protreptical inherency is established to the basic relativity of its existence and continuation. The different states of the consciousness of the mind can asseverate the idea of that veracity and illative analysis.
With the efficiency of a consectary purview, we could then assume the apodicticity of the soul, within the expository stoicheions of philosophy, as a zetetic reference and not an anapodictic maxim or an unnecessary extrapolation of the diachronicity of the soul. We are cognisant of the process of the dedition of the body in death, yet we are uncertain of the in esse and in posse states of the soul, after the completion of mortality. From the divergence of those two states, the fundamental thing that is definite is the transformation of one state to another? This would not imply the states are antithetical to the function of this action, since the actuality is not contradictory to the potentiality.
To acknowledge that the soul is immortal is not illogical to the quintessential nature of philosophy, when we establish the antevenient course of the soul and the potential of the soul's limitation. By acknowledging the soul's existence in a mortal and immortal form, we do not accede to the cunctation of that possibility, within the compoundable nature of the alterity of the soul as energy. To be more precise, the energy that is the transumption of the soul is universal and thus conducive to the idea that the soul is universally endless in matter and form. We possess the symphytic ability to perceive matter and form.
What should be learnt about the imminution of mortal life is the irrefragable essence and continuum of the soul. If we thus proceeded with the quondam thought, the metonymic comparison between the demiurgical one and the soul would be better understood, beyond the axiom of the argument of the soul, as the Universal Creator is the monad and the soul as the Dyad or second cause. The problem that conflicts with other forms of philosophy, religion and science is the descriptive nature and feasibility of the soul.
If we obviously applied a heuristic observation to the soul, we would discover the omnibus of the optimal probaliorism of the probative soul and its ipseity as energy. This would allow us to enquire the reason and the inusitate effects determined, with that metemperical observation. The argument would be misconstrued for platitude or sciolism, instead for the basis of the quiddative elements of a desitive synthesis that was reflected of any measure of apodicticism.
Is the conscience attached to the desideratum of the soul or is it a dilogical discept of an Eleutherian sense? If we analyse the germaneness of the methexis of the concept of the soul, we will surmise that the conscience is a mechanism or instrument of the soul's existing manifestation. Ergo, that declared statement would result in a utible philosopheme. If we described the universal states of the mirific soul, we would conclude, then that the adumbration of the definition of the soul is found in the realm or omphalos of the conscience.
To debate the hylism of the soul's form as energy is to distinguish the megalopsychy of the soul and its dilation, with the synanthropic nature of human beings. This would not contradict, with the ratiocination for the argument of the soul as mortal and immortal in its existential form and matter. The hypodochetic reference to the soul is attached to the quale of the soul, within the transitivity of its longevity. I must denote that the theory of palingenesis within philosophy is highly contested, but the hyponoia and properties of the soul are emphasised and are not the endechomen of the argument at all.
Hence, if we applied the theory of the principle of universal causation that implicates all things have causes, though not necessarily deterministic causes, then we can metaphysically conceive of the noeton or the intelligible as a soul. Whether we regard the soul, as a numinosity of the stasis of its hegemonical reference or the heteron of the body is a mere question of interpretation. The principle of universal causation is sustained in this argument, because the cause of the soul is connected to the hypodochemene.
From the universal hypodochemene that is the soul, we are conscious of the apthartos, in the horismos and kathodos of the synechy of the soul that is conducive to the volition and function of the soul. To better comprehend the hypodochomene, we must first comprehend the hyperousia of the nature of the soul, with the sophrosyne that supports this philosopheme. To understand the nature of the hyperousia there must be a hypostasis to define the soul. If we insinuate that pure energy is the hypostasis of that soul, then the hyperousia of the soul would be an idion of the universe.
How do we rationalise that in a logical form of metaphysics that is relative to the argument presented? How do we conceive the plausibility of the soul, as substance and form that is not a homonymy of an irrational thought? How do we associate its aition or cause to the adiaireton of the matter that the soul is consisted of its existence and katachronon?
To effectuate that we could use Aristotle's actuality concept of energy which is used, with the concept of dynamis that signifies the two known modes of existence. Within this remarkable comparison, the actuality is the mortal aspect of the soul and the potentiality is the immortal aspect of the soul. The nexus would demonstrate the state of each variable. We would then be able to discern the distinction from the actuality to the potentiality, in the relativity of the energy of the soul.
Aristotle wrote in his Metaphysics: If there were no other independent things besides the composite natural ones, the study of nature would be the primary kind of knowledge; but if there is some motionless independent thing, the knowledge of this precedes it and is first philosophy, and it is universal in just this way, because it is first. And it belongs to this sort of philosophy to study being as being, both what it is and what belongs to it just by virtue of it. We could easily apply this clarification of metaphysics to the Universal Creator, the afterlife and the soul.
For Aristotle, the soul is the existing and ultimate form of any living being. Because all beings are composites of form and matter, the form of living beings is that which imbues them with what is particular to living beings that defines their true essence that consists of that matter in its supervenience. The epagoge of that meticulous observation can be perceived, as being protreptical and logical in the study of metaphysics. Subsequently, the noetic pysmaticity into the subject was continued, by other prominent philosophers, who advocated the philosophical teachings on the material.
To imply that the soul is thus independent from the body is not unreasonable, when we realise the nature of the concept of pure energy as form and matter. The intrinsic nature of the quiddity of the soul is discovered in syneidesis or consciousness, and demonstrative in the universal states of the variables of the soul. There is no greater form of deliberation used than the telos of the arsis nous and euporia learnt in the universal knowledge of philosophy that is defined, as pantosophy. We can implement the knowledge of pantosophy to facilitate the prime function, for the application of syneidesis and synderesis, with its entire activation. Philosophy can debate the midenism of the zoilists and resolve the engrossing questions and axioms of metaphysics that transcend any subdoxastic conformity or unalterable perception.
With philosophy we learn about the signification of the ulterior purpose of the monos of the one and endoxa of the soul in unison. We learn the special connection of the one and the soul that invariably corresponds to the process of mortality and immortality that is linked to the heimarmene of the soul. We contemplate the nature of the psyche also, with the various assumptions of the soul and the extrinsic influence of science. The omnilegent nature of the topic of the hypodochemene and the ephemeron life cycle of the human soul is not to be related to the piacular notion of nocence and repentance in religion, or the fidimplicitary negations and rebuttals of science.
We must reach a complex heightened state of syneideticity or condition of consciousness to understand the universal essence and capacity of the hypodochemene. We can reach that superb state of awareness, through the practice of meditation and cognition. Only then, we can reconcile the synecdoche to the process of the immortality of the soul and realise the variance and alloiosis of the states of our consciousness. Within the reverie of the state of consciousness, is the relativity of the effulgence of the universe and its existing properties of which the soul is one of those intellectual properties revealed, for the sake of the posterity and the aeons of the cosmogony.